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Evaluating decentralization in terms of three  Decentralization policies are most success-
economic criteria - social efficiency, technical  fully implemented if:
efficiency, and equity - the author argues that
some decisionmaking (about finance and teacher  *  There is a tradition of self-reliance in local
recruitment) should be provided for at the local  communitit.,.
level, and crime  (about school organization and
cuirriculum)  at the regional level.  *  Local governments or communities have
their own sources of tax revenues and voluntary
A system of central government grants  contributions.
should be used to correct problems of equity and
inefficiency inherent in a decentralized system.  *  The pressure for decentralization originates
in the community rather than with ministry plan-
Little is known about the economic and  ners.
educational consequences of decentralization,
despite a wide variety of country experiences.  *  All important affected political groups, es-
The effects of decentralization are difficult to  pecially teachers, are involved in and informed
isolate, so scholars have focused instead on  about the development of decentralization plans.
,ssues  of implementation.
* Administrative capacity at the local level
either exists or is provided thrugh  training.
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Summary
Educational decentralization  policies have been  areas  depends  on the structure  of government  finance,
adopted  or are under  consideration  in a number  of the  poLitical  environment,  government  and administrative
developing  couies  Educational  development  proj-  structure, and the historical  and cultural context.
ects  inevitably  have  some  impact  on the degree  of cen-  Given  these  conditions,  economic  criteria  can  be used
tralization  in  education.  These facts provide the  to evaluate  decentralizaton  plans.
rationale  for a critical  assessment  of decentralization  Three  economic  criteria  are used  to evaluate  decen-
and an evaluation  of developing  countries'  experience.  tralization  - social  efficiency,  technicl efficiency,  and
This  paper  defines  educational  decentralization,  pres-  equity. These  criteria  argue  for some  decisionmaking
ents economic  criteria  for evaluating  decentralizaton  areas (finance,  teacher  recruitment)  provided  at the
policy,  assesses  the results  of decentralizaton  policies,  loca level,  with  other  areas (school  organization,  cur-
discusses  factors  which influence  successful  imple-  riculum)  supplied  at the regional  level,  and a system
mentation  of decentralization,  and makes  recommen-  of central  government  grants to correct some of the
dations  for further research to guide Bank lending  efficiency  and  equity  problems  inherent  in a decentral-
policy.  ized  system.
For the purposes  of this paper, decentralization  Little  is known  about  the economic  and educational
policies  will  be categorized  as those  which  (i) dele-  consequences  of decentralization,  in spite of a wide
gate decisionmaking  to autonomous,  public  entities,  variety  of country  experiences  The effects  of decen-
(ii) deconcentrate  decisionmaking  to subnational  di-  tralization  are difficult  to isolate, and scholars  have
rectorates  of the central  government,  and (iii)  devolve  instead focused  on implementation  issues. Decen-
decisionmaking  to local governments  or community  tralization  policies  are most  successfully  implemented
organizations.  Devolution  receives  the most critical  if there is a tradition  of self-reliance  by local  commu-
attention  in this paper.  nities;  if local  governments  or communities  have  their
The degree  of centralization  in educational  systems  own  sources  of tax revenues  and voluntary  contribu-
typically  varies  with  the decisionmaking  areas,  includ-  tions; if the pressure  for decentralization  originates
mg school organization,  curriculum  and  teaching  with  the community  rather than ministry  planners;  if
methods,  examinations  and supervision,  teacher re-  all  important affected political groups, especially
cruitment  and compensation,  finance  of recurrent  ex-  teachers,  are involved  and informed  about develop-
penditures,  and school  construction  and finance. The  ment of decentralization  plans;  and if administraie
desirability  and feasibility  of decentralzation  in these  capacity  at the local level  either already  exists  or is
trained.2
I.  Introduction
In recent years there has been renewed interest by  through the nationalization  of schools. IronicaRy,  co-
countries,  international  aid organizations,  and scholars  lonial administrative structures were used to imple-
in  decentralization of government, including public  ment such centralization  policies.
education.  Countries on every continent have either
considered or attempted to implement some form of  Rationale  for Decentralization
educational decentraluation.  In  1972, Peru  estab-
lished regionalized  directorates and community  nuclei  Countries may adopt decentralization  policies  for a
to reduce bureaucracy  and incorporate disadvantaged  variety  of reasons, some explicitly  expressed in policy
groups  in society. In 1974,  the Philippines  established  statements, some of which are only  implicitly  revealed
thirteen regional offices  of the Ministry  of Education  through administrative  actions. The rationale for edu-
to undertake regional  planning  and administration. In  cational decentralzation can be grouped into three
1977, Nigeria modified its constitution to  establish  broad  categories: (i)  educational finance, (ii) effi-
local governments,  whose main function is provision  ciency and effectiveness,  and  (iii) redistribution of
of primary education. And, in 1980,  Chile instituted  political  power.
the most radical decentralization policy  to date, as-  Fmancial arguments for educational decentraliza-
signing the responsibility  for elementary and secon-  tion are  a recent phenomenon.  The proportion of
dary  education to  municipalities, along with local  school-age  children  enrolled hi primary  and secondary
revenue sources to support them.  schools  has grown rapidly over the past two decades,
International aid organizations  have, by and large,  and educational expenditures have grown rapidly as
been supportive  of such decentralization  policies. The  well. Central governments  now find themselves  facing
United States Agency for International Development  severe fiscal constraints to  continued expansion of
(USAID) has generally  favored strong community  in-  educational  opportunities. Hence, shifting  part of the
volvement in educational planning (see Korten and  burden for support of primary and secondary  cduca-
Alonso, 1981), and a  recent director of the Agency  tion to subnational  units of government,  to community
strongly  supported decentralization  efforts. UNESCO  and voluntary organizations, and to parents has be-
has generally  favored  decentralization  as one means of  come an increasingly  attractive alternative. The form
incorporating  marginal  groups in public decisiGnmak-  of shifting  advocated  in decentralization plans varies
ing and improving  the quality  of services  they receive  with a variety  of country characteristics,  including  the
(see the 1982  UN Report).  The World Bank has no  form of government,  colonial administrative  heritage,
official position on  educational decentralization  but  and traditions of community  involvement.
has generally been  sympathetic to  decentralization  Efficiency  arguments for decentralization typically
efforts  (see  the  1983  World Bank  Development  focus on the high unit costs of primary and secondary
Report).  education provided by the central government. One
Finally,  scholars have repeatedly  studied the decen-  explanation  for such high  costs is inadequate national
tralization  phenomenon,  recently  with an emphasis  on  government  capacity  to administer a centralized edu-
both political motivation  for and the implementation  cational  system. Another explanation is the costs of
of decentralization  efforts.  The scholarly  interest of  decisionmaking  in a system  where even the most mi-
the  1980s is in contrast to scholarly articles of the  nor local education  matters must be decided  by a geo-
1 9 50s, which expressed most interest in decentraliza-  grA.phically  and culturally  distant bureaucracy in the
tion and establishment  and strengthening  of local gov-  capital city.  Yet another explanation is the frequent
eroments as a means towards democratization (see  application  by education ministries of national stan-
Conyers, 1984).  Scholarly interest parallels govern-  dards for  curriculum, construction, teacher quality,
ment interest in decentralization in those two time  etc., thereby preventing  cost savings  through adjust-
periods.  During the 1960s and 1970s scholars and  munts of educational  inputs to local or regional price
countries were more interested in central government  differences.
planning,  including  educational  planning,  and implica-  The effectiveness  rationale for decentralization  ar-
tons  of  such planning for  centralized control of  gues that the centralized planning  policies popular in
resources. The implications  of planning for centrali-  the 1960s  have resulted in expensive  education,  which
zation were complemented  by African independence  is decreasing in quality.  After independence, many
and resulting efforts to eliminate colonial influences  countries (e.g., Guyana) nationalized and centralized3
their educational  systems  and established  free educa-  that of key decisionmakers  within the central govern-
tion as a right. Given  current fiscal  constraints,  such a  ment.
policy  can continue to be followed  only with decreas-
ing educational  quality. Administration  and accounta-  Questions  to be Answered
bility can be improved in education, it is argued, by
making schools more responsive to parents and local  This paper does not deal further with the issue of
communities  and eliminating  the need for central  gov-  why countries choose to  dec=tralize  Rather, the
ernment  decisions  on  local  educational matters.  focus  here is on whether decentralization  is wise edu-
These  arguments  are  buttressed  by  evidence of  cational policy.  Examination of this issue requires
greater cost-effectiveness  in the  private sector.  In  that  a  number of specific questions be  answered.
Senegal,  for example,  unit costs are higher and exam  Among  the questions  requiring answers are:
pass rates are lower in public than private, religious
schools.  *  What is meant by the term decentraliza-
An example  of these arguments  for decentralization  tion?  What, specifically,  does it mean in
is given in the sixth five-year  plan of Pakistan:  the context of public education?
The nearly comprehensive  nationalization of
educationa institutions and the accompany-  *  What kinds of decentralization  are in fact
ing policy  of free education  ten years ago had  undertaken  by developing  countries?
at least two casualties. An already impover-
ished Government was landed with a  large  *  What is the desirable level of centraliza-
financial  burden which restricted it from ex-  tion or decentralization from an analytic
panding education. And many of the schools  perspective?  How is the answer to this
of high quality, some of them run by educa-  question affected by the economic,  politi-
tion-conscious  communities,  lost their excel-  cal, and administrative  institutions  of most
lence under the public  controL This, in both  developing  countries?
quantity and quality, was counter-productive.
(Government  of Pakistan, The  Sbih Five-Year  *  Typically, there  is  divergence between
Plan, 1983-1988,  Planning Commission, Is-  stated goals and actual outcomes of gov-
lamabad, pp. 318-319,  as quoted in Jimenez  ernment policies.  What are the political,
and Tan (1987).)  economic, and  educational consequences
Redistribution  of political  power is rarely stated as  of decentralization?
an objective of decentraization, but democratization
or inclusion of marginal groups in society is a  fre-  *  Decentralization  itself leads to  problems.
quently  stated goal. An example is the 1972  Peruvian  What is the central government's proper
educational  reform which explicidy  attempted to in-  role in correcting  those problems in a de-
dude Indians and other disadvantaged  groups in edu-  centralized educational system?  Which
cation decisionmaking. McGinn and  Street (1986)  factors appear to most strongly influence
argue that redistribution of political  power is the pri-  successful  implementation  of decentraliza-
mary objective of decentialization. With that as the  tion policies in terms of stated goals?
objective, decentralization may  be  undertaken  to
empower those groups in society  which support cen-  *  Finally, after reviewing the literature on
tral government  policies or to weaken groups posing  educational decentralization, what is the
obstructions  to those policies. Thus, decentralization  statur  of  our  knowledge?  And  what
in  Mexico has  served to reduce the  power of the  should the  priorities be  for  further  re-
teachers  union by  transferring salary negotiations  search and study on the subject?
from the central to the state government  leveL From
this  perspective, decentralization is less concerned  The term decentralization  has several  definitions,  as
with the transfer of power from one level of govern-  shown below, but most commonly it  refers to  the
ment to another than it is with the transfer of power  devolution of some degree of decisionmaidng  power
from one group to another.  And, ironically,  one con-  to the local government  or community  organizations.
sequence of decentralization may be to increase the  Unless stated otherwise,  this is the definition  used in
effective  control of the central government,  or at least  this paper.4
II.  Definition of Decentralization
Centralization-decentralization  can be viewed  as a  cies,  which  may then receive  public  funding  and are
spectrum  ranging  from a unitary  governmental  system  ultimately  accountable  to the government.  The most
where  the central  govermment  has  most  power  or dcci-  commonly  delegated  areas  in the education  sector  are
sionmaking  authority  to a governmental  system  where  vocational  and higher  education.  Autonomous  train-
local  governments  and community  organizations  exer-  ing agencies,  such  as SENA  in Colombia  and SENAI
cise  large amounts  of power.  The ultimate  central-  in Brazil  have  been  established  in a number  of devel-
ized  system  is one in which  all decisions  are made  in  oping  countries.  These  agercies  typically  are assigned
the nation's capital,  and the ultimate  decentralized  a general  task (e.g.,  vocational  training),  given  an in-
system  is one where aU  decisions  are made  by indi-  dependent  source of revenue (often an earmarked
viduals,  community  organizations,  and small local  payroll  tax),  and report to a board of directors  rather
governments.  than any particular  minister. Similarly,  universities
are often autonomous  bodies which receive  direct
DefInItIons  fumding  from the government  but are subject  to little
direct  control.
Since  most countries  are relatively  centralized  in  Examples  of delegation  in elementary-secondary
terms  of public  decisionmaking,  most  policy  discussion  education  are not readily  found. In Lesotho  most  ele-
concerns  alternative  means  of decentralizing,  not cen-  mentary  education  is delegated  to the churches,  with
tralizing Four types  of decentralization  are typicaUy  teacher  salaries  paid  by the govemnment;  this pattern
identified  in the Uterature  (Rondinelli,  1984): decon-  was  not uncommon  elsewhere  in Africa  prior to inde-
centration,  delegation,  devolution,  and privatization.  pendence.  In other  countries,  it is not uncommon  for
If successfuly  implemented,  each  of these  types  of de-  the government  to pay  aU  or some  portion  of teacher
centralization  results  in a unique  system  for financing  salaries  in religious  schools,  even  when  public  schools
and for delivering  education. In what follows,  I will  exist as well.  Examples  are Papua New Guinea,
attempt  to define  these terms and give examples  of  where  teacher  salaries  in religious  schools  are paid  by
educational  systems  corresponding  to each  type.  the government,  and Paraguay,  where  some teachers
in religious  schools  receive  pay  from the government
Cenflzed  Decisionmaking  (Winkler,  1980).
In a centralized  governmental  structure,  education  Deconcentrated  Decisionmaking
is  financed  and managed  from  the center. The  nature
of education  is such  that some decisionmaking  power  Deconcentration  refers to the transfer  of authority
must  be gven to school  teachers  and administrators,  to lower levels  within central  government  agencies.
but typically  they  can  make  only  the most  routine  deci-  Often this takes the form of creating  or expanding
sions  and have  no or little  control  over  resource  allo-  powers  of regional  directorates.  This has  been an es-
cation  in the schools. An example  of a centralized  pecially  common  form of decentralization  in Latin
country  is Cameroon,  where almost all educational  America. Among  the countries  which  have estab-
revenues  are derived  from central  government  reve-  lished  regional  directorates  of the education  ministry
nues (excepting  some fees in  former Angiophone  are Peru,  Colombia,  Chile,  and  the Philippines.  These
provinces),  and the central government  determines  directorates  vary  in power,  but they  often  have  the re-
curricla, sets and evaluates  exams,  and recruits,  as-  sponsibility  of supervisiwon  and planning  for the region.
signs and promotes teachers and  administrators.
There  are  administrative  representatives  of the Minis-  Devolved  Decibwonmaling
try of Education  outside  the capital  city,  but their  fis-
cal and decisionmaking  independence  is very  small.  Devolution  implies  the creation  of autonomous  and
independent  subnational  units of government,  which
Delegated  Decwsionmaking  have  authority  to raise  revenues  and spend. Devolu-
tion  may  result  in a strong  central  authority  and com-
Delegation  is the transfer  of government  tasks or  munity-financed  and managed  schools. It may,  also,
functions  to autonomous  organizations  such  as public  result  in a federal  form of government  in which  gen.
corporations  and many  regional  development  agen-  eral purpose  regional  or local governments  have  re-S
sponsibility  for the finance and provision  of elemen-  does not have sufficient  revenues to fully fund secon-
tary and secondary  education. The similarity  between  dary education.  Both Kenya md Indonesia, for ex-
devolution  and federalism  is demonstrated by a popu-  ample, have free, nationalized primary education and
lar economic  definition  of federalism:  more decentralized  provis'on  of secondary  education.
A public sector with both centralized  and de-  For example, in Kenya the central government has
centralized decisionmaking  in which choices  established  conditions  to foster development  of com-
made at each level concerning the provision  munity-based  ("harambee") and  financed secondary
of public services are determined largely by  schools,  but such schools  will  probably be nationalized
the demands for these services by the resi-  or managed and financed by the central government
dents of (and perhaps others who c? ry on  as the central government  budget permits.
activities  in)  the  respective  juir.'  ~.ction.  An important  feature of the eclectic model is the
(Oates, 1972)  parallel existence  of several types of schools. For ex-
There are a number  of examples  of federalism  among  ample, in Kenyan  secondary  education, one finds cen-
developing  countries  including  Brazil,  India, Malaysia,  tral  government schools (23 percent  of the  total),
Nigeria,  Pakistan,  and Papua New Guinea. In each of  community "harambee"  schools (50 percent),  and
these countries decisionmaking  authority is divided  subsidized  community  or private schools (21 percent)
between  the central government  and regional  govern-  (Ayot and Lills, 1985). Another feature of this eclec-
ments.  Local governments, also, typically exist in  tic  model is  government subvention, usually in the
some form, but  in most countries their power and  form of teachers salaries, of education provided by
authority is determined by the regional government;  private, usually  religious,  schools. In some cases, sub-
furthermore, regional  government  is often highly  cen-  ventions may cover almost the entire cost of teacher
tralized,  even in a decentralized,  federal  system.  compensation,  yet management lies with the private
Elementary and  secondary education may be de-  school. For example,  in Indonesian secondary  educa-
volved  to regional governments,  local governments,  or  tion one finds a combination  of government schools
both.  In India, education was devolved  to the state  (56 percent of the total) and private schools (44 per-
governments  in the constitution  of 1950,  although  the  cent), with the private schools receiving significant
central government  still plays  an important role in de-  government  subventions  (20 percent of total compen-
termining the size of revenue transfers to the states  sation costs) in  the  form  of  payment of  teacher
for education. Primary and secondary  education  have  salaries.  In  addition, even students in  Indonesian
also been devolved to  the provincial  level in Papua  government  schools  pay sizeable enrollment  fees, con-
New  Guinea. On the other hand, primary  education  is  stituting  as much as ten percent of recurrent expendi-
devolved  to local government in Brazil and Nigeria,  tures (Meesook,  nd).
while secondary  education  is largely  the responsibility  Another version of the eclectic model is, in prin-
of the regional or state governments. In Brazil, the  ciple,  the educational  system  which  has centralized  de-
organization  of primary education  varies by state, but  cisionmaking  but which has many of the characteris-
in most states there exist parallel local and state pri-  tics of decentralized  systems: salary scales which  vary
mary school systems  with local schools  funded largely  by location, local provision  of some educational serv-
from local government revenue sources and  state  ices through contracts with the central government,
schools funded by state revenue sources; both school  and substantial community input to  local school 5i-
systems also receive some transfers from the central  nance without commensurate local control.  In prac-
governmcnt. In Nigeria, the local government  it re-  tice, systems with centralized decisionmaking  rarely
sponsible  for managing  primary  schools  and providing  permit these characteristics  to exist.
revenues for school construction and materials and
supplies,  but most operating  revenue  comes  from state  Measures of Decentralization
government  transfers, and state revFnues  in turn are
largely  derived from the central government.  A measure of decentralization  would ideally  meas-
ure control or decisionmaking  authority.  One plau-
7he Eclectic  Model  sible measure of control over resource allocation is
the percent of expenditures  born directly  by users and
Some countries do not fit well any of the descrip-  local (or regional)  government. Three problems exist
tions given above. In particular,  some countries have  with this measure.  The first and most serious is that
centralized and nationalized  systems of primary edu-  central  government regulations  and  mandates  on
cation but decentralized  systems  of secondary  educa-  subnational units of government may result in those
tion, in large part because the central government  units having  very  little control over resource allocation6
or spending  in spite of seemingly  high direct financial  sponsibility  of the state governments, and the local
contributions  to education. For example,  if the central  government contribution to  education  has  conse-
ministry  of education mandates class size and teacher  quently  declined over time (Tilak, 1984).
salary, which represents a high proportion of recur-  The rationale for decentralization  may differ mark-
rent expenditures, the subnational government may  edl:y depending on  the  level to  which educational
have control over very few rescurces.  decisionmaking  responsibilities  are assigned. Decen-
A second problem has to do with the treatment of  tralization to  the  regional level is most  frequently
central government transfers to subnational govern-  undertaken for reasons of administrative  convenience
ments.  Subnational  units of government  may receive  (as  in Latin America)  or  to  appease  subnational
transfers in the form of block grants, categorical  edu-  cultures  (e.g., India and Papua New Guinea). Decen-
cation grants, and earmarked tax revenues.  If such  tralization  to the local level is more commonly  under-
trans;ers are relatively  stable over time, they may be  taken as a means of democratization and increasing
de facto  own-source revenues of the lower unit of  citizen participation, especially  of ethnic or disadvan-
government;  this is especially  true if the transfers are  taged minorities,  and as a means of stimulating  larger
fungible  such that the lower unit of government  can in  financial  contributions  by the community.
fact rae  a special grant for general purposes.  But if  In  most developing countries, local governments
the magnitude  of, say, earmarked revenues  varies with  have relatively  little independence. Even among fed-
political and  educational conditions, such revenues  eral countries,  constitutions rarely specify  the powers
may be defacto central government  revenues,  in spite  of local governments (Brazil and Nigeria are excep-
of the fact that government  accounts  show them being  tions); most constitutions spell out only relations be-
directly  distributed to the lower units of government.  tween the regional  and central governments  and leave
A third difficulty  is that the degree of fiscal decen-  the assignment of local government powers, to the
tralization  is determined not only  by the proportion of  regional government. In fact, it's not clear that local
funding directly provided by lower units of govern-  governments have any more  power in federal than
ment  but,  also, by  the  number of lower  units of  unitary systems.  Local governments are frequently
government. Other things equal, the larger the num-  dependent on regional  governments  for some services,
ber  of units of government, the more, control local  the pass-through  of some central government  grants,
citizens have over resource allocationi  decisions in  approval of tax increases, and appointment of chief
their local schools.  government  officers.
An alternative measure of decentralization would  Primary and  secondary education  may  be  the
more directly reflect the distribution  of decisionmak-  responsibility  of the central, regional,  or local govern-
ing authority. This measure would reveal the degree  ments in a federal system. And, when the responsibil-
of central government control over major kinds of  ity is assigned to local authorities, those authorities
educational decisions:  curriculum, construction and  may be elected by local citizens (as in Brazil and Sri
construction standards, teacher assignment  and pay,  Lanka),  appointed by  regional  authorities (as  in
etc.  Decisionmaking  with respect to the various edu-  Malaysia and Korea), or some mix of the two (e.g.,
cational functions  is discussed  in more detail later.  India where local councils  are elected but the chief ad-
ministrative  officer is appointed by the state).  Fur-
Regional  'iersus Local Autonomy  thermore, education may be  assigned to  a  general
purpose government  (such as a municipality)  or to a
Educational  decisions  can be made at several levels  special purpose government or  special district; the
- national, regional,  local, the school or school dis-  latter is uncommon among developing countries, al-
trict, and the family.  Decentralization  refers to the  though community  schools financed by some combi-
decisionmaking  authority of subnational  units of gov-  nation  of contributions  and compulsory  fees resemble
ernment,  but quite clearly  decisionmaking  by regiona.  the special district.  Special districts are, however,
governments  in India is quite different  from decision-  used in the provision  of some urban services  and could
making  by the community  in the "harambee" schools  conceivably  also be used in education.
of Kenya.  Furthermore, there may be conflict be-
tween decentralization at the regional and the local  Decentralization  of Education Functions
levels.  In  Chile, for  example, municipalization  of
education came at the expense of the regional direc-  In discussing  centralization-decentralization  in edu-
torates, which were established earlier (Magendzo  cation, it is useful to disaggregate the provision of
and Egana, 1985). In India, the 1950  constitution  as-  educational services into its various components or
signed elementary and secondary education as a re-  functions.  For the purposes of this analysis, these7
components  are labeled: school  organization;  curricu-  local or regional governments  responsible for financ-
lum and teaching methods, examinations  and supervi-  ing elementary-secondary  education; this is the case,
sion; teacher recruitment and compensation;  finance  for example,  in Brazil. In the mixed  mode! -where  the
of  recurrent expenditures; and  school construction  community often supplements central or  regionally
and finance. The degree of centralizaton of decision-  provided education with its own contributions, un-
making differs by component. For example,  curricu-  equal opportunities are the result of both factors --
lum decisions may be highly centralized at the same  variations in tax base or income among communities
time that school construction and finance is very de-  and  central government decisions to  distribute re-
centralized.  It is the mix of decisionmaking  powers  sources  unequally,  this is the case, for example,  in the
with respect to the various components  which  leads to  secondary  schools  of Kenya.
a summary  description  of an entire educational  system
as being centralized or decentralized.  Table 1 sug-  Cwiicuhlm  and Teaching  Methods
gests the mixes most commonly  found in educational
systems described as centralized, decentrahzed, and  As with school organization,  curriculum standards
mixed.  are usually regulated and teacher education usually
For any given country, the degree of centralization  provided by the  central government; in most coun-
with respect to each component can be determined  tries, public school curriculum standards are,  also,
through the examination  of educational  plans and op-  extended  to private  schools  (e.g., Indonesia). Curricu-
erational guidelines  of the ministry  of education. But  lum is typically  viewed  as being the domain of experts,
there is often a discrepancy  between  what is written or  who mainly  reside in teacher colleges  or the ministry
reported and what is practiced. In particular, the cen-  of education.  Teacher education is, also, typically
tral government  often sets guidelines for curriculum,  viewed  as the responsibility  of the central government,
teacher qualifications,  school construction standards,  or the regional  government  in large decentralized  sys-
etc., which are unrealistically  high given the income  tems.  In-service training, however, is usually  some-
and human resources  of the country. The result may  what more decentralized,  with either a  regional gov-
be that what appears to be strict central government  ernmnent  or  the regional directorate of  the central
regulations  and mandates  are not enforced and are in  ministry  playing  an important role in organization  and
fact largely ignored by the providers of educational  delivery.
services.  Centralization of curriculum decisionmaking  need
not imply a uniform curriculum.  In Cameroon, the
School Organization  curriculum follows the French model and  is highly
specific  and identical  in all parts of the country. But
School organization  refers to the establishment  of  other centralized countries have attempted to differ-
mnimum  schooling requirements, the  structure of  entiate the curriculum  to meet the instructional  needs
elementary-secondary  schooling,  and the rights of chil-  of different social groups. A tightdy  controlled peda-
dren to education.  Excepting a  very few federalist  gogy can be one policy response to the problem of
systems (e.g., the  United  States), decisions about  poorly qualified  teachers.
school organization  are highly  centralized. However,  Centralization of curriculum decisionmaking  also
in spite of a high degree of centralization,  large differ-  need not imply  centraized production  and distribution
ences in  compliance with organizational standards,  of textbooks. The ministry  of education (or, in some
especially  in providing  educational  opportunities  to all  federal  systems,  the regional secretariat of education)
children, are found in all school systems. (e.&, ine-  can produce and distribute textbooks to schools or
qualities in service provision  between  regions, income  school children.  Or it can purchase and distribute
groups, and urban/rural  areas are found in aU coun-  textbooks. Or it can simply  require students to pur-
tries; see Carron and Chau).  chase their own textbooks  from either the ministry  or
The major difference between decentralized and  local bookstores. In addition, the ministry  can either
centralized  school  systems  lies with  which  level of gov-  specify  the precise textbooks to accompany  the cur-
ernment makes the resource allocation decisions  re-  riculum, or it can give schools the freedom to select
sulting in unequal opportunities.  In the centralized  from an approved textbook list.
model unequal educational opportunities are the re-
sult of resource allocation  decisions  made in the min-  Examinadons  and Supenrision
istry of educion  itself.  In the decentralized model,
unequal educational opportunities are usuaBy  the re-  Perhaps the most crucial question regarding educa-
sult of differences in wealth or tax base between the  tional supervision  is who selects the chief administra-8
Table 1
CemtzlUinton-DeentllU on Typology  for Public  Educatlon
Cwucum  and  Eaninadom  and
Schoo  Oankldon  Teaching  Mahods  SupOwision
Minimum  schooling  Curdculum,  teaching  Bxaminations  set and
requirements and  matedal  pre.service  evaluated,  as wel as
school  organization  and in-ervie  instruc  teaching peforance
Centralized  (preschool. primary  tion prwided by the  evaluated by central
Model  secondary,  vocational,  central ministry  of  ministy of education;
higher education) set  education.  reponsibility for direct
by the central  supervision often lies
government,  with regional adminis-
trative offices.
The central government  Curriculum,  teaching  Examinatic-  e set
determine  oraniza-  materials, and in-  centraly  "aaly
tion of the schooling  service instruction  adminisht.  ind ea-
system,  but the local  established  and  uated regionahy, the
Mixed  community  helps  provided by the  intructin,  often
Model  determine how  many yeas  centra government  through regional or
of education are provided,  or through its  distrit  offices
often tbrough at least  regional  delegations
Ieast temporary self-finance
if  years beyond those
funded  or authoried  by
the central govnment
Orgnation  of schooling  The basic contents of the  No national examination
Is almost al  as set by  curriculum are set cen-  system exists; all exam-
Decentralzed  the central ministry  of  traly,  but textbooks may  inations are set and eval-
Model  education;  the local  be selcted  and purchased  uated localy, the central
community  deddes how  locally,  and in-senrice  or regional governments
many yeas  and levels  of  instruction may be provided  -mually  ptovide limited
education  wilt be provided  locally  or regionally  depend-  superision of teachers
ing on the size of the locale,  and schools
tive  officer  of a school  or group  of schools and what  appointed  by an elected  mayor  or counciL  Between
power  that  individual  has over  the various  educational  these two extremes  is the administrator  who is ap-
functions. The chief admnistrator  is typicaly ap-  pointed  by the ministry  and gwen  considerable  deci-
pointed by the ministry  (or the regional  e?  i  ttion  sionmaking  authority  over resource  allocalion  within
secretariat)  in a highly  centralized  system  arxi may  the schools.  In many  countries,  transportation  is suffi-
have  relatively  few  powers  other  than  sending  person-  ciently difficult and  human resources sufficiently
nel evaluations  to the ministry  and monitoring  the  scarce  that,  irrespective  of how  the administrator  is se-
education  and examination  system  to assure  compli-  lected, there is very little actual supervision  of the
ance  with  ministry  guidelines.  On the  other  hand,  in a  schools.  The fact that in many  countries  administra-
decentralized  system  the chief  administrator  may  be  tors are  also responsible  for  supervising  private
direcdy  elected  by the local community  or may  be  schools  only  exacerbates  this resource  problem.9
Teacher  Reaument  Fnance of Recuman  Scheol Construcdon
and Consadon  E&xnditures  and Finance
Central government  All recurrent expendi-  Central government
sets acceditation  tmres  fully funded by  sets construction
standards, pwrides  central government  standards, which may
teacher education,  excepting  minor user  be uniform for the
sets teacher pay  fees; nonteacher  entire country, and
scates, and directy  resources distributed  coven ali construc-
pays  the teacher  to schools  tion costs, although
in some cases  the local community
(Francophone Africa)  may be required to
teacher recruitment,  provide labor and/or
pay, and promotion  some constructon
may be under control  materials.
of the civil  service
ministry  rather than the
miistry  of education.
Teachers may be  The central or regional  Constrction  standards
selected by the  ocal  government  proide  most  are set by the central
school authority,  funding  of local schools  or regional goernment
but the central or  in the form of block  and matching  funds are
regional govemment  grants or project grants,  often provided for
typically  prescribes  but some portion of  school construction; in
pay scales; accredi-  educational expenditurcs  some cases the match-
tation standards are  are funded by local  ing funds take the form
also set centrally.  revenue sources, and the  of a promise by the
local community  has  central government  to
some influence on total  cover some portions of
expenditure levels.  recurrent expenditures,
often teacher salaries.
Teachers are telected  Local government  funds  Land and materials for
and p  scales are set  elementary and sometimes  school construction are
by local govenmuent;  secondary  education from  provided by the local
accreditation standards  local revenue sources;  community,  tabor may be
arm  typically  set by the  user fees or "voluntary"  voluntary;  local construc-
central  emrnment  but  contributions to the  tion standards used.
they may not be enforced.  parents-teachers associa-
tions may be required;
block grants or project
grants may be provided
by the central government.
Examinations  provide  a standard  for measuring  and  and  grade  exams  nationally  or regionally.  Although  a
evaluating  learning Variation  in examination  control  system  of national  examinations  is typicaly  found  in
and procedures  is perhaps more extreme  than any  the centralized  model,  Latin America  demonstrates
other educational  function. In many  former British  that  local  control  of examinations  and promotion  stan-
colonies  (e.g.,  countries  in the  West  Indies)  exams  are  dards  can coexist  in relatively  centralized  systems.
set and graded  in England.  At the other  extreme  are
nost countrtes in Latin America  which have no stan-  Teacher  Recauinent and Compensation
dardized  national  or other examinations;  as a result,
the criteria  set for passing  from  one grade  or one level  Accreditation  standards  for teachers  are almost  al-
to the next  are set at the school  level  and vary  greatly.  ways  set centrally  (a notable  exception  is the United
In between  these  two  extremes  are countries  which  set  States  where  state governments  license  teachers),  but10
the criteria set for accreditation are often ideal stan-  addition, they found the relative importance of local
dards which cannot be met in practice.  The local or  government finance is larger in  federalist countries
regional  labor market  for teachers determines  defacto  and in luge  countries.
local or  regional accreditation standards, even  in  In  addition to  directly financing education, the
highly  centralzed school systems.  central government  also often exerts other kinds of fi-
Teacher recruitment and promotion practices vary  nancial control.  Frequently, it performs an auditing
greatly between countries.  In a  highly centralized  function  to assure  voluntary or local contributions  are
country like  Canmeroon  the  ministry of  education  used in accordance with regulations.  This auditing
doesn't even control recruitment and promotion. In-  and  financial control often extends to  private and
stead the ministry  of public  service recruits, appoints,  community-based  schools,  where central governments
promotes, and  moves teachers; nationally recruited  often regulate user fees or  development fees (e.g.,
teachers are also likely to enjoy civil service protec-  Kenya).
tion.  In a decentralized  country  like Brazil,  the com-
munity may itself recruit teachers, and employment  School Construcdon  and Finance
and promotion may be in part politically  determined
(patronage of the elected mayor). Teacher compensa-  In the centraized model, the central government
tion practices are highly correlated with recruitment  sets uniform construction  standards and directly car-
procedures.  When recruitment and  promotion are  ries out all school  construction. In the decentralized
centralized, there  typically is  a  national pay scale,  modet, the local community finances (often through
which does not vary with working conditions. When  voluntary  contributions) and constructs  schools using
recruitment is decentralized,  teachers are usually  paid  local materials and  construction standards.  In the
in  accordance with local labor  market  conditions.  mixed model, the central government may construct
One may also find (e.g., in Latin America) national  schools using different regional  standards, or  the
pay scales and local recruitment of teachers. Further-  community constructing its own school may be re-
more, even in centralized systems with national pay  quired to follow  government  standards for the school
scales,  one may find  local communities  recruiting  and  to be accredited and staffed.
setting teacher pay for additional  g,ades beyond those  In practice,  school  construction  and finance tends to
provided  by the central government.  be more decentralized  than the other components  of
elementary-secondary  education, especially  in Africa
Finance  of Recurrent  Expenditures  and Asia.  In many countries the central government
offers an implicit matching grant, promising to staff
In a highly  centralized  educational  svst-m, the gov-  the school constructed  by the local community  (eg,
ermnent both finances  and directly  provides all inputs  Eastern Nigeria,  Kenya,  Zimbabwe,  India).
with  no local contribution  (excepting  minor matricula-
tion fees).  In a decentraized system, the local com-  Conclusions
munity finances and directly provides inputs, either
through local tax revenues (e.g., Brazil) or through  In assessing  whether an educational system  is cen-
"voluntary"  fees (e.g, Kenya). A mixed system  would  tratized or decentralized,  it is necessary  to look at the
include central government finance and provision  of  distribution of decisionmaking  authority with respect
some educationa inputs (e.g., books,  supervision)  and  to  various educational functions.  In doing so, one
grants (block  and/or project) to regional or local gov-  finds some educational functions (e.g., curriculum)
ernment and some local community  control over use  tend to be controlled  centrally,  even in systems  which
of those funds (e.g., Colombia, India, Nigeria).  An  in other respects appear decentralized.  And, some
example of the latter is the Indian midday  meal pro-  educational functions (e.g., construction) tend to be
gram which is provided by the local community  but  provided lecally, even in systems which in other re-
partly  financed  by central government  grants. In gen-  spects appear centralized.
erat  the finance of government services is more de-  It is the combination of decisionmaking  authority
centralized  in developing  than industrialized  countries.  with  respect to the various functions  which determines
In an unpublished  monograph, Bahl and Linnes find  whether the system can be characterized as central-
15 percent of total government expenditures are fi-  ized or decentralized. But the answers to three ques-
nanced at the local level in developing  societies,  com-  tions  best  diccriminate between  centralized and
pared with 32 percent in industrialized  countries. In  decentralized  systems. Those questions are:11
* Who selects  the chief  administrative  offi-  *  What  proportion  of total expenditures  is fi-
cers of local schools,  and what control  do  nanced through local revenue sources,
they  have  over  resource  allocation?  both tax  revenues  and voluntary  contribu-
tions?
* Which  level  of government  is responsible
for recruiting  and promoting  teachers?  Is
there a national  pay  scale?12
HI.  The Principles of Decentralization
The desirable  level of centraliation in education  is  rangements  for the finance and provision  of public
that which  maxiies  social  welfare. However,  since  services.  As typicaly  used in elementary-secoedary
there are no direct measures  of social  welfare,  the  education,  however,  decentralization  refers  to devolu-
question  of the desired  level  of centralization  must  be  tion of decisionmaking  authority to  a  subnational
answered  using  a variety  of proxy  criteria. The prin-  level,  regional  or local, of government. The most
ciple criteria employed  here are:  social  efficiency,  important  constraints  to devolution  occur  at the local
technical  efficiency,  and equity. But application  of  leveL  As a result,  it is devolution  to the community  or
these  criteria  is a mere academic  exercise  unless  the  local government  which  is the focus  of the analysis
political  and institutional  contexts  are considered  as  below.
weLL  In what follows,  the political  and institutional
constraints  to either centralization  or decentralization  Constrsats on the Locus  of Decslon  _
are first  discussed.  The initial  conditions  of the politi-
cal and institutional  contexts  and their relationship  to  Public  Finance
decentralization  are summaized  in Table  2.
As noted earlier,  decentralization  is an ambiguous  Decentralization  implies  that the communi:v  or lo-
term which includes  a variety  of governmental  ar-  cal government  has decisionmaking  authoriql  with
Table  2
Inlufal  Condltions  for Decent  on
Initial Conditons Amayed on Scale of LaV&est  to Smallest D  iffulty
in Implementing  Decennavlzaion
Govffnmar  Fnmane  Polcat  Cont  AdmrzaAde Suctr  H  1im Conas
Direct  centr  govermment  Decentralizaton  policy  Constitutdon  assigns  Tradition  of depend-
provision  of educational  introduced  by the central  s  ity  for  ence by local  eom-
Inputs  to local  schools.  government,  no consultation  education  to cental  munides  on the cen-
witb  affected  groups,  and  government;  lack  of  trnt govermnent.
Conditional  cash  gants  assocated  with  a partcular  admindati  capac.
for specific  projects  or  politician  or political  party.  ity at local  leveL
functions.  Tradition  of self-
Central  government  relanee  by locld
Decentrization  advocated  by  administrative  tasks  communities  and
Unconditional  educatonal  the central  govement with  already  deconc4ntrated  spiit of compet-
block  grants  or earmarked  consultation  with  affected  to the regional  or local  Ition  between
share of central  govn-  groups  and with  broad  pol-  leveL  communitie.
ment tax revenues  tical suppot
Some  edueational  de-
ciionmaking  gvhen  to
lar,  local-government  Pressue for decentralzation  loal authorities,  and
own-sourc  revenues  from  oriinates at the local  level  local  authorities  per,
taxe and voluntary  cash  and with  affected  group,  mtted to raise  some
and in-kind  contributions,  induding  parents,  teaches,  educational  revenues.
and local  government
offiala  Local  autorities  given
significant  decisionnmak-
ing respobilities,  result-
ing in devslopment of lo-
cal administative  capcity.13
respect to both the level and distribution  of educa-  other hand, centraly administered taxes tend to have
tional resources. These resources  may  be financed  by  uniform tax rates, thereby limiting  the revenue-raising
transfers from the central government,  own-source  tax  authority of local jurisdictions.  While it would be
revenues,  user fees, and voluntary  association  fees.  possible to  devise centraly-administered taxes with
As noted earlier, the most common form of trans-  variable rates, this is rarely if ever done.
fers  from the  central  (or  regional) government is  Fmaly,  communities  can raise revenues for educa-
payment  of teacher salaries. In addition, central gov-  tion through ustr  fees, donated labor and materials,
ernments frequently provide grants to  local or re-  and voluntary  or involuntary  association fees.  Quite
gional government for specific educational nlans or  clearly,  some countries (e.g., Kenya,  Indonesia) raise
projects. Both of these transfers are accompanied  by  substantial revenues through these sources.  But a
regulations and restrictions that greatly limit the re-  variety  of problems limit the use of user fees and vol-
source allocation authority of the local schools.  Of  untary association  fees in most countries.
course, to  the  extent  such transfers are  fungible,  Often there are both legal and political  constraints
meaning the local government  would  have purchased  on user fees.  The level of user fees imposed by the
the same inputs in the absence of the grants, they in  community or  the  local parent-teacher  association
fact provide a  new source of unencumbered funds  (PTA) is usualy limited and regulated by the central
(albeit with administrative  costs associated with pre-  government  due to the conflict  such fees present with
paring projects,  disbursing  funds, and monitoring  and  notions of "free education  and equal access". Simply
auditing use of funds).  the reporting requirements for such fees may either
Central government  transfers to local governments  limit their use or provide an incentive for local juris-
can be constructed  to give local governments  substan-  dictions  to not report their use (e.g.,  see Paul's discus-
tial resource allocation authority while stiU fulfilling  sion of Guyana).  In other  cases, schools are  not
objectives  of the central ministry  of education. But in  permitted to keep the fulU  revenues from the fees,
reality the grantor (the ministry) typically  mistrusts  thereby limiting incentives to impose fees.  For ex-
the use of funds by local education authorities and,  ample,  in Indonesia schools  can set fees, but aU  reve-
thus, attaches a number of conditions (such as proj-  nues accrue to the central government, which then
ects) to the use of funds. The result can be, and fre-  redistributes  the proceeds (Meesook).
quently is, centralized resource allocation in a seem-  If truly voluntary,  association  fees such as those for
ingly  decentralized  educational  system.  the PTA suffer  from the usual free rider problem. In
Communities  or local governments,  of course, can  some African countries (e.g., Kenya, Anglophone
often raise their own revenues,  which  can be allocated  Cameroon) such fees  raise  significant amounts of
in accordance  with local priorities. But the possibili-  revenue only because they are in effect involuntary.
ties of raising substantial  local revenues  are often lim-  On the other hand, contributions can come from a
ited  and  sometimes prohibited  by  the  country's  wide variety of sources and organizations,  including
constitution. The most common  local government  tax  parents, alumni, and local businesses. The variety of
is the property tax which suffers from two major de-  possible voluntary fees and other contributions are
fects: (i) low  revenue elasticity,  which  makes it a poor  discussed  elsewhere  (Bray, 1985).
tax in a changing  environment,  and (ii) requirements  In addition to fees, communities  can provide  labor
for sophisticated tax administration,  including  cadas-  and materials for  school construction, maintenance,
tral surveys,  objective  assessments,  and a professional,  etc.  These in-kind contributions appear to be most
skilled administrative corps.  The requirements for  successfdul  when there  is a definite target  (e.g., con-
good property tax administration  are typically  unmet  structing a  school or competing with a  neighboring
in developing  countries.  community)  but are less  useful as a means of financing
Another means of providing  own-source  tax reve-  recurrent expenditures. A problem with  relying  on in-
nues is through a  national tax on personal income,  kind contributions  of labor is that the opportunity  cost
sales, employees,  or some other measure of business  of labor rises as per capita income increases. Thus,
activity,  with some portion of the proceeds  earmarked  such contributions are less likely to be successful in
for automatic return to state or local governments. In  urban areas than rural areas and are  less likely to
Brazil,  for example,  a portion of a two percent payroll  generate significant revenues in middle-income  than
tax is automatically  returned to state governments  in  low-income  countries.
proportion to revenues raised within the jurisdiction.  In sum, there are serious constraints  on the ability
Such automatic  transfers of earmarked revenues  avoid  of local  governments  or communities  to raise revenues
the administrative requirements of the property tax,  to support local schools. In some countries these con-
and the tax itself may be more revenue  elastic. On the  straints may pose an effective  deterrent to the intro-14
duction of decentralization measures which require  Govemment  and Admninistrative  Sructure
local governments  to  raise revenues.  However, for
most countries,  aside from legal constraints,  local gov-  Both the structure of government  and administra-
ernments could, with technical assistance in tax ad-  tive  capacity  can  also  serve  as  constraints  to
ministration, community organizing,  etc., raise some  decentralization. Structure of government refers to
revenues for local education.  constitutional and  other legal constraints, including
the existence  of sub-national  units of government,  and
Political  Contet  whether chief administrative  officers  are appointed or
elected, while administrative capacity refers  to  the
Both the  political context and the  administrative  ability to make and implement decisions; to collect
structure of a country  may  also pose constraints  to de-  revenues,  budget, and keep government  accounts;  and
centralization. The political  ideology  and policy  posi-  to monitor and audit expenditures.
tions of key actors and interest groups in education  In most countries, the constitation determines the
play an important role in both the adoption and im-  institutions  of government,  including  the existence  and
plementation of decentralization measures.  As dis-  powers of  sub-national units  of  government. The
cussed later, lack of political  support, not a shortage  constitution, or other legislation,  assigns taxing and
of technical expertise,  most frequently is the cause of  spending powers as well as governmental  functions,
failed decentralization  plans. The key political  actors  including  education,  to different  levels  of government.
on the decentralization  stage include functionaries  in  If the constitution  assigns  most power to raise revenue
the ministry  of education, teacher organizations,  local  and most education decisionmaking  authority to the
government  officials,  local school  administrators,  par-  central government, decentralization  may be difficult
ents, and parent-teacher associations.  to legislate. The magnitude of the change required
Decentralization  entails the redistribution  of politi-  suggests new legislation  may be forthcoming only in
cal power between different  groups in society. While  the  case of national emergency or  revolution (e.g.,
it may increare twe  power of local government  at the  Chile).
expense of the central government, decentralization  The colonial  adm;nistrative  heritage of a country  in-
frequently strengthens the power of the central gov-  fluences  the writit  . the constitution,  citizen expec-
ernment (Conyers, 1984). In Chile,  devolution  of pri-  tations, and adminmstrative  practice. Spanish colonial
mary and secondary education to the municipalities  rule, for  example, was hierarchical and centralized,
occured simultaneously  with closer central govern-  characterized by  paternalistic legislation regulating
ment control over the municipalities  with mayors ap-  minutiae in  the  colonies.  Regulations established
pointed by the president and previously-elected  com-  ideal rules of conduct,  even if those ideals were unre-
munity advisors being appointed by the mayor.  In  alistic. Little or no attention was paid to local condi-
Mexico,  delegation  of teacher negotiation  authority  to  tions and regional differences  in drafting and promul-
representatives of the  ministry of education in the  gating  regulations.
thiry-one states appears to have had the underlying  The same pattern persists in most former Spanish
political goal of weakening the bargaining power of  colonies today, well over a  century after independ-
the union (McGinn and Street, 1986).  ence. According to Hanson (1974),  there tends to be
To be successful,  decentralization  plans must yield  hierarchical leadership in the ministry of education,
enough influential  winners  to more than offset  the los-  and political allegiance is the principal criterion for
ers, and the plan must be constructed  so as to prevent  appointment to important educational  positions. The
any one group of losers from blocking  the entire plan.  result is that educational decisions are largely made
Since many interest groups tend to be risk averse,  the  on the basis of political  not educational  grounds. The
mere uncertainty  associa.ed  with the outcomes of de-  ministry  still issues a comprehensive  set of rules for-
centralization is an important deterrent to change.  mulated for ideal conditions not found in the  real
The  political constraint may not necessarily argue  world, with the requirement that children and schools
against attempting any form of decentralization,  but it  conform to  ideals, not  generally allowing variation
does prescribe care in attending to political concerns  depending on local conditions. The result is a high
in assembling  a decentralization  plan.  While the lit-  degree of  centralization, local officials visiting the
erature on implementation  suggests some of the po-  central ministry  to obtain favors much as in colonial
litical problems which may arise, there is no positive  times,  and a local citizenry  with no developed  sense of
theory of implementation  to guide policymakers.  autonomy and local control.  Decentralization,  which15
requires a sense of local autonomy and control and  government  and the administrative  capacity  at various
reduced power at  the ministry level, is difficult to  levels  of government  can act as serious constraints  to
implement  given this administrative  history.  decentralization.  Effective decentralization may re-
One finds much the same administrative  heritage in  quire constitutional change, changes in va!ues, and
former French colonies.  The French administrative  training to  improve administrative skills in  some
system  had very  weak subnational  units of government  countries.
and highly  centralized  control. This heritage makes it
difficult for ministries to give up  control, and  local  Historical  and Cultural  Context
communities  tend to lack the requisite skills for man-
aging themselves  (Nellis has described how the intent  The historical  and cultural context also strongly  in-
to  decentraize  in Tunisia was frustrated by  these  fluences  the ability to decentralize.  Some countries
factors).  (e.g., Kenya,  Nigeria)  have  a tradition of local commu-
The British colonies were, also, highly centralized  nity participation  that extends  beyond the colonial ex-
as a  means of exerting colonial control.  But the  perience and facilitates  attempts to decentralize edu-
British also introduced a  t-adition of fee-based and  cation.  Other countries have regarded decentralized
cc.mmunity-supported  education, which was some-  education (especially  the mission schools) as a colo-
times affiliated with religious missions. Included in  nial institution  and have centralized and nationalized
this tradition was the important role of support groups  education  upon independence. In still other countries,
like the PTA and Old Students or Old Boys alumni  religion introduces values which either  facilitate or
organizations. These support groups have tended to  deter decentralization. Islam, for example,  values  the
persist, even after the nationalization  of schools by  diffusion  of authority,  which  in countries like Pakistan
newly independent countries and  even in  socialist  is conducive  to attempts to decentralize.
countries  (e.g.,  Zagefka  discusses  their  role  in
Burma). The tradition of user fees,  voluntary  associa-  Social Emicency
tions, and local control facilitates the successful  im-
plementation of decentralization  policies.  There are a number of administrative,  political,  his-
Administrative  capacity  at each level of government  torical, and  cultural variables which influence how
-- central,  regional,  local -- can also serve as an impor-  educational services are  financed  and  delivered.
tant constraint on decentralization. The capacities of  These variables cannot be  ignored in attempting to
local  governments  to tax, spend, and keep government  answer the rather academic  question, what is the de-
accounts  were discussed  earlier with respect to public  sired degree of centraUzation  in education.  But un-
finance. Capacity  at the local level  is, also,  required to  derstanding  that these variables  can act as constraints
administer a personnel system with some degree of  on decentralization,  one can still ask, if these condi-
civil service protection.  In addition, in a system in  tions permit choice as to the organization of govern-
which the central government transfers resources to  ment, what is the desirable  level  of centralization. Are
lower levels of government, the central government  there economic  grounds for advocating decentraliza-
requires the capacity  to audit the use of funds and to  tion policies?  Three economic criteria are used to
prosecute corrupt practices,  and auditing  cannot occur  answer this question: social efficiency,  technical effi-
in the absence  of standardized  accounting  practices  by  ciency,  and equity. The definition  of these criteria and
the governments  receiving  the funds.  their implications  for decentralization  in education  are
The administrative  capacity  of governments  is also  summarized  in Table 3.
influenced by the education and training of decision-  Social efficiency  refers to the use of society's re-
makers as well as the individuals  who elect or appoint  sources to maximize  social  welfare. As used here, it is
those decisionmakers.  If local citizens  are largely  il-  especially  concerned  with  the match between the pref-
literate, they may not be able to make informed, ra-  erences of citizens  regarding  education and the educa-
tional choices in electing local leaders who advocate  tional services they receive.
particular education policies. If local government  ad-
ministrators  are poorly educated and have weak ad-  Public  Choice
ministrative  skills, they may make poor educational
policy  decisions  and lack the ability  to carry them out  The match between consumer-citizen  preferences
or to appoint qualified  administrators  to do so.  and public  service  provision  is often studied under the
Iz brief, the institutional  structure and history of  rubric "public choice," which is the  application of16
market principles  to the provision  of government  serv-  functions. It may not be appropriate for local voters,
ices. This match is presumed  to be closer or better if  especially  if poorly educated, to select the curriculum
the consumer-citizen  in fact has choices.  That is, if  and set accreditation standards, but it is appropriate
the consumer-citizen  has the ability  to elect local edu-  for them to exercise  some choice over how their per-
cation leaders, decide how much to pay in taxes in  sonal income is allocated between government and
order to receive  a desired level  of educational  services,  private goods and choice over how the government
and has the freedom to  move to another jurisdIction  budget  is  divided between  education  and  other
("vote with the feet") offering a preferred .;ombina-  services.
tion of tax and  service levels, social welfare is pre-
sumed to be higher.  Public choice becomes private  Extemalities
choice when citizens choose to send children to pri-
vate schools,  in which  case they can directly  select that  Externalities  refer to the division  between  who pays
school which offers the desired combination  of user  for services and who receives the benefits. Elemen-
fees and educational services.  Public choice is the  tary-secondary  education exhibits  significant  externali-
economic  argument for citizen participation  in educa-  ties in the form of benefits to society from having a
tional decisiormaking. In its pure form, this partici-  literate, skilled, well-socialized  population.  One can
pation takes the  form of citizens directly selecting  conceive  of a local community  which all the children
educational leaders,  educational taxes or  fees, and  leave, perhaps due to lack of employment  opportuni-
educational  service levels.  ties, when fully  grown and educated.  The parents of
The consumer-citizen  may be frustrated in effec-  children  in the community  will  receive private  benefits
tively  expressing  preferences by a number of factors.  as a result of their children being educated and the
First, citizens  may  be unable to either directly  (voting)  economic  returns which  accrue to that education. But
or indirectly (voting for a local, general government  others in the community  may perceive themselves as
head who appoints the school chief) elect the local  receiving very few private benefits.  On  the  other
school administrator.  Second, citizens may be con-  hand, all members of society,  especially  in the commu-
strained in their ability to raise local tax revenues, to  nities to which the  children move, receive societal
set user fees or to impose  involuntary  association  dues  benefits resulting  from the education of the children.
for the purposes of raising  education  revenues. If in a  In  other words, other  members of  society receive
decentralized system citizens are  unable to  express  benefits without having  had to pay for them, i.e., an
preferences  or intensity  of preferences  with respect to  externality.
educational leadership, revenues and  expenditures,  In a decentralized system, interjurisdictional  spill-
the match between  citizen  tastes and educational  serv-  overs of benefits such as those described  above consti-
ices provided  may not be any closer than that in some  tute externalities  which tend to reduce the amount of
centralized systems.  educational  services  provided  by the local community.
A third factor limiting  the expression  of preferences  If taxing  and educational  spending  decisions  are made
is the inability  of citizens  to move fronr one jurisdic-  by the local voters,  they will ignore the externality  and
tion to  another to find the  desired combination of  thus spend too little on education. Two solutions  to
taxes and educational services.  If jurisdictions are  the problem are possible.  One is to nationalize  edu-
large, citizens are less likely to be able to make such  cation, such that all the externalities are internalized
moves  than if jurisdictions  are small. And if local ju-  in making decisions  about educational  spending, this,
risdictions  are not allowed  by the central or regional  of course,  is not consistent  with decentralization. An-
government  to vary  their tax rates and/or educational  other solution  is for the central government  to provide
expenditures, "voting  with the feet" is of little conse-  matching grants to  local jurisdictions to encourage
quence.  them  to  increase  their  spending on  elementary-
A fourth factor which limits the expression  of pref-  secondary  education  to assure generation of the desir-
erences is central government  regulation. To the ex-  able level of social  benefits. Of course,  social  benefits
tent the  central government attaches conditions to  are not easily measured, and the desirable level of
grants to the local government and to the extent it  social  benefits is not easily  determined.  How society
mandates the level and use of educational resources,  values these external benefits can only be revealed
the local consumer-citizen  may be dissatisfied  in the  through the process used to select national (or  re-
resulting  quality  and quantity of educational  services.  gional) leaders and the budgetary priorities they as-
Of course,  local public  choice  needs to be tempered  sign to education.
by other considerations,  in particular externalities  and  In addition to  interjurisdictional spillovers,  there
economies  of scale with respect to some educational  are other external benefits associated with particular17
Table  3
Econemic  Criteria for the Evaluatlon of Decentrallfatlon
Implcations  for Cenaraliwtion/
C*eda  Definiion  Decetralzation  in Educadon
Social  Effickncy
Public  Choice  Tbe match between  Local citizens should have an important voice in
consumer-citizen  preferences  choosing the combination  of taxes/fees and edu-
and public service provision.  cational services  in the community  and should also,
have some influence  on the nature of educational
services  provided.  Central government  regulations,
restrictions, and mandates may limit public choice,
as may the local tax base and impediments to the
ctizen "voting  with his feet".
Qxternalities  The discrepancy  between  Interjurisdictional  spillovers  may result in insuffi-
who pays for services  and  cient educational spending in a decentralized  system.
who receives the benefits.  The central government  may need to institute a
system  of matching  grants to assure a socially
desired level of spending.
External Effidency  The balance between  In a country with distinct urban/rutal and regional
labor skills  provided by  labor markets there should be variation within the
the educational system  country in terms of school organization,  curriculum
and labor market demand.  and the quantity of schooling.
Tcha  Effickncy
Internal Efficiency  Maximization  of educa-  Internal efficiency  is higher when prices of educa-
tional output for a  tional inputs are allowed to vary with local (urban/
given educational cost  rural, regional) market conditions,  and the educa-
tional input mix is adjusted for local prices.
Economies  of scale may argue for centralization  of
some educational functions. Administrative  costs,
including  both administrative  capacity and the time
required to make decisions,  also affect unit costs
and, thus, internal efficiency.
Technological  Change  An increase in the edu-  Technological  change and innovation in educational
cational output possible  organization  and service delivery  is likely to be
from a given level of  greater in a system which  both permits and encour-
inputs.  ages educational diversity  and competition.
Eguk
Horizontal Equity  Individuals  in like  When some portion of school revenues are generated
circumstances  are  from local tax sources, variations in wealth of the
treated equally.  local tax base may lead to horizontal inequity. The
central government  can reduce the size of the
problem through grants in aid to local schools  with
the size of the per pupil grant varying inversely  with
the local tax base per capita.
Vertical  Equity  Relative  equality of  Equality of educational opportunity may be measured
educational opportunity.  by access to and quality of education.  In centralized
systems,  inequality  is the result of central govemment
decisions regarding resource allocation; in decentralized
systems inequality may result from variations in local
tax base and citizen  willingness  to pay for education.
In either case the central government may use grants-
in-aid to reduce spending disparities and improve
equality  of opportunity.18
educational  functions  which  may argue for either cen-  centralized systems,  there are uniform, national pay
tralized or decentralized decisionmaking. Standard-  scales for teachers,  and many school inputs (e.g., text-
ized examinations  and similar  school organization  and  books,  furniture, food for school  meals) are purchased
curriculum standards across communities or regions  centrally  and distributed to local schools.
may, for example,  facilitate  inter-regional  migration  of  Second,  internal efficiency  is affected  by administra-
human capital both for the purposes of employment  tive  costs and efficiency,  including  administrative  over-
and further schooling. The result may be better in-  head, management capability,  and time required for
formed and more efficient  labor markets.  decisionmaking. The argument is sometimes made
that decentralized  administration  leads to the duplica-
Extemal  Efficiency  tion of administrative  functions  in each of the local (or
regional)  jurisdictions  and, thus, leads to increased  ad-
External efficiency  is the match of labor skills with  ministrative  costs.
labor market demand. Most countries  or even  regions  The argument of duplicated costs essentially con-
are large enough to encompass  rural areas where agri-  cerns economies  of scale. Some administrative  func-
cultural  activities  predominate,  urban areas with  heavy  tions -- teacher supervision,  budget preparation, local
concentrations  of retail and  -ffice activities,  and in-  planning  -- are of necessity  carried out in small scale
dustrial  areas  occupied by  manufacturing firms.  at the local level,  irrespective  of the degree of centrali-
Somewhat  different  labor skills are demanded in each  zation with respect to  other educational functions.
of these geographic  areas, which may argue for differ-  But other administrative  or educational  functions  may
ent education  to better prepare students in the needed  exhibit sizeable economies of scale.  These functions
skills and to maximize  the social  returns to public in-  include: curriculum  development,  development  of in-
vestment  in human capital.  Different education may  structional materials, and  setting and grading stan-
entail variation in  school organization, curriculum,  dardized examinations. Thus, there  may be a cost
and the quantity of schooling  provided.  argument  for  centralization of  some  educational
External efficiency  argues for variation  with respect  functions.
to school  organization,  curriculum and the quantity of  The scarity  of management skiDs in developing
schooling. Such variation could be provided through  countries  can  also  argue  for  centralized admin-
the centralized ministry  of education,  or it could come  istration,  wherein a few, skilled and educated adminis-
about as  a  result of  decentralized decisionmaking.  trators make decisions for the entire school system.
Experience  suggests that centralization  tends to lead  But, as noted above, it's  difficult to avoid locating
to uniformity in school organization and curriculum  some administrative  functions at the local level, even
but not uniformity  with respect to quantity of school-  in a centralized school system; some decisionmaking
ing.  Decentralized decisionmaking  may be required  requires knowledge  of the local situation that a physi-
to yield the desired variation consistent  with external  cally removed administrator  cannot know well.  Still
efficiency.  the lack of management skills argues for somewhat
greater centralization  in, say, setting examinations  and
Technical EMfldency  supervising  local schools.  There is little evidence in
general, that decentralization has served to improve
In addition to social efficiency,  the degree of cen-  public management (Rondinefli Nellis and Cheena).
tralization may affect technical efficiency. Technical  Nor is there evidence to show that decentralization
efficiency is primarily concerned with efficient re-  has  increased local participation, at  least in Latin
source allocation within the educational system, or  America.
minimizing  unit costs.  Centralization  of decisionmaking  has one unambi-
guous cost -- the time required for decisions to be
Intemal Efficiency  made.  Often even the  most minor expenditure of
funds or personnel  action requires filling  a form, send-
The degree of centralization  affects several  aspects  ing it to the ministry (perhaps via an intermediary
of resource allocation, or internal efficiency. First,  regional ministry  representative),  awaiting  a response,
internal efficiency  requires adjusting input combina-  perhaps sending another appeal prior to receiving  the
tions consistent with  prices in  the  locality of  the  response, and perhaps receiving  a response requesting
school. Under centralization,  this is unlikely  to occur  more information or better justification for the re-
unless local representatives  of the ministry are em-  quest. Bureaucrats  in the central ministry  have incen-
powered to determine what prices they are willing  to  tives to be cautious in their actions but no incentives
pay for services,  materials and supplies. But in most  to quicldy  respond to requests from the field.  In the19
meantime, the lack of affirmative response, to even  rural and poor areas where the central and regional
obvious requests, may have serious negative conse-  governments  have failed to provide educational op-
quences for education. One possible  response to this  portunities equal to those in urban and richer areas.
situation is to improve response time it  the ministry,
but the bureaucratic incentives  are such that response  Technological  Change
time will always  be slower ttln  that found in a decen-
tralized system.  A  nationalized educational system is a  monopoly
Technical efficiency  is also affected by the use of  which, excepting  a few private schools which usuaRy
community resources.  The community devotes re-  serve either the very rich or the very poor,  permits
sources, in both pecuniary and non-pecuniary  forms,  little or no competition. As noted earlier, even the
directly  to the production  of educational  services and,  competition from the private sector is often heavily
also, to lobbying for additional education resources  regulated, including  tuition charges.  The results of
from funding sources.  The argument is frequently  monopoly  in other industries are well known -- little
made that  if the local community  is given more re-  incentive  to innovate,  excessively  high costs,  and insuf-
sponsibility  for funding education and selecting local  ficient production.  A  plausible hypothesis is  that
education  leaders, it is likely  to increase direct partici-  some of these same  results are found  in highly  central-
pation in the schools.  If this increased productive  ized educational  systems. Another plausible  hypothe-
participation is accompanied by decreased (socially)  sis is that, other things held equaL decentralization
nonproductive  participation  in lobbying  for funds, the  may lead to greater competition  between local school
net result is an increase in educational services with  systems and,  consequently, greater  innovation and
no increase in cost. But if the increased  participation  technological  change,  reflected in lower unit costs.
comes at the expenise  of citizen time spent in other
endeavors, including leisure, there is an opportunity  Equity
cost to the increase in educational  services.
There is little evidence on either the social  or tech-  The principal  objections  to decentralization  concern
nical  efficiency consequences of  decentralization.  the consequences  for both horizontal and vertical eq-
There are no studies to determine the extent to which  uity.  A  related  equity concern, especiaUy  among
decentralization  in fact alters the nature of education  school  teachers, is unequal pay for equal work;  decen-
services  offered and the degree to which  beneficiaries  tralization to  the  local level  implies variation in
of those services are more or less satisfied. With re-  teacher pay  scales,  reflecting  local labor market condi-
spect to  technical efficiency, construction costs  of  tions.  The only effective  solution to this pay equity
locally-constructed  schools  tend to be lower  than min  concern is a national  pay scale, which  in turn implies a
istry-built  schools  due to the use of lower cost materi-  high degree of centralization.
als and lower costs associated with contract admini-
stration.  On the other hand, there has been concern  ifoizontal Equity
in Nigeria  that the growth in the number of local gov-
ernments, which are responsible for elementary  edu-  The principle of horizontal  equity  refers to individu-
cation, may be increasing the costs of administrative  als in like circumstances  being treated equally. Edu-
overhead.  cation  which is  locally financed may violate  this
There  is  some  evidence  that  locally-provided  principle;  individuals  of given income and wealth lev-
schooling  may be of lower quality. The wharambee"  els are treated differently  depending  on the tax base of
schools  of Kenya,  for example,  are of low  quality,  both  the community  in which they live. A community  with
in terms of inputs (teacher quality) and outputs; only  a high tax base per school child needs to set a lower
13 percent of "harambee" schools exceed minimum  tax rate to yield a given amount of revenue per child
standards  (grade 4 attainment levels) compared to 79  than does a community  with a lower tax base.  If the
percent of central government  schools. But evidence  tax base is property wealth, two individuals  with the
from Brazil is mixed,  at least with respat  to quality  of  same wealth pay  different tax  bills  depending on
inputs; expenditures  per pupil are lower in municipal  whether  they  live  in  the  low  or  high  tax  base
than state schools  in the Northeast,  but the opposite is  community.
true in  some states in the  South.  In neither case  Horizontal inequity can have negative effects on
(Irazil  and Kenya) can low quality of education be  economic  efficiency  (Buchanan). All individuals  have
attributed to decentralization;  rather, the cause of low  an incentive  to live in the high tax base, low lax rate
quality  education appears to be the fact that locally-  jurisdiction,  but it is only those of high income who
provided schooling appears to be  most common in  can respond to the incentive. The result is conimuni-26
ties which tend to be segregated on the basis of in-  per capita basis,  thereby increasing  inequities  between
come;  either the rich or the poor 1ive  in a given com-  rich and  poor  regions.  And  in  Eastem  Nigeria,
munity. If the high income individuals  also have skills  wealthier communities  were found to respond most
(e.g., medical) demanded by all members of society,  strongly  to government  incentives  for the construction
the result of geographic  segregation  may be an over-  of new schools. On the other hand, Knight  and Sabot
supply  of such skills  to the wealthy  community  and an  (1986) compared Kenya,  which permitted a large ex-
undersupply  to the poor community.  pansion of secondary  education via community  sup-
Grants-in-aid  can be used to solve or at least ame-  ported harambee schools,  and Tanzania,  which  did not
liorate the horizontal equity problem.  The central  permit such expansion  by local communities  and exer-
government  can distribute  block grants,  the per capita  cised strict quality  controls. They concluded  the Ken-
size of which is inversely  related to the local tax base,  yan system provides greater equality of oppoortunity
and thereby effectively  reduce any tax advantage to  even though spending  disparities are larger.
living in a wealthier community.  Alternatively,  the  As  noted  above, the  central  government could
central government  could specifically  reduce the hori-  largely  remedy the vertical equity problem while still
zontal inequity for education by distributing  grants to  retaining the public  choice advantages of the decen-
local schools, the per  students size of which is in-  tralized  system.  To  reduce  vertical inequity, the
versely related to the local tax base per pupil.  The  central government  would  need to either make uncon-
foundation plan used in many states of the United  ditional  block grants to offset differentials  in tax bases
States sets a minimum (foundation) desired level of  of general local governments,  or make per pupil edu-
educational  spending  and then eliminates  any tax base  cation grants, the size of which is inversely  related to
advantage for spending up to that foundation level.  the tax base per pupil. In the latter case, the central
Beyond  the foundation  level, communities  may decide  government  would  need to decide if it would  offset tax
to tax and spend whatever  they wish. Of course,  if the  base advantages  for any level of educational  spending
foumdation  level is not set high enough, there are still  or only offset tax base advantages  up to some speci-
powerful  incentives  to individuals  to locate in commu-  fied (foundation) level oi spending.
nities with a high tax base.  The central government can also use project or
other conditional  grants for specific  educational pur-
Vertical  Equity  poses to help offset tax base and spending differen-
tials.  But these grants tend to be  administratively
Vertical equity in education refers to the relation-  cumbersome,  inefficient  in accomplishing  the educa-
ship between educational expenditures and  family,  tional objectives  of the central government,  and come
community,  or regional income or wealth.  Ignoring  accompanied  by central government  restrictions  which
how education is financed, maximum  vertical equity  limit local public  choice (see Winkler's analysis  of in-
would entail all children receiving  the same value of  tergovernmental  education  transfers in Brazil).
educational  resources, measured either on a per year  Central governments  in decentralized  systems have
basis or on a lifetime  basis. Measured on the basis of  sometimes attempted to ameliorate educational in-
annual expenditures,  large inequalities  in educational  equities. In Brazil,  the formula  for distributing  federal
spending currently exist in developing countries be-  elementary-secondary  education monies to *he states
tween urban  and  rural  areas, between geographic  is highly  redistributive  and not strongly influenced  by
regions, and between income groups, irrespective of  political considerations (World Bank, 19&5). Both
the degree of centralization  in decisionmaking.  Meas-  Eastern Nigeria and Kenya took actions to redistrib-
ured on the basis of lifetime educational  expenditures,  ute government  grants in favor of lower income com-
these inequalities  are much larger stilL  munity schools. On the other hand, both Chile and
A decentralized  educational system in which com-  Zimbabwe  allocate government  grants on a per capita
munities (or  regions) both raise revenues and make  basis with  no consideration  of community  fiscal capac-
educational expenditures is likely to yield significant  ity. And Tilak (1986) found no relationship  between
inequalities in educational spending if only due to  federal education grants to  provinces in  India and
differences  in tax base and income between  communi-  measures of income levels or educational needs and
ties.  concluded  that grants are primarily  allocated  on politi-
The empirical  evidence  on the effects of decentrali-  cal grounds and  only serve to  exacerbate spending
zation, however, are ambiguous.  In Chile, for ex-  disparities.  Finally,  a study of OECD countries found
ample, municipalization  was accompanied  by altering  no relationship  between  forms of government  (unitary
central grants from a system  that redistributed in fa-  vs. federal) and governmental  efforts to bring about
vor of poorer regions to one which redistributes on a  greater educational  equality (Noah and Sherman).21
IV.  Role of the Central  Government
in a Decentralized System
If political,  institutional,  and administrative  condWions  tional functions  may solve  some of the problems  noted
permit a decentralized  educational systema  to operate,  above but at a possibly  large cost in social efficiency
that system  leads to both improvements  and problems  (mismatch between citizen-consumer  preferences  and
in social efficiency,  technical efficiency,  and equity.  public educational services and a  possible mismatch
The net result depends very much on  the circum-  between skills produced and local labor market de-
stances of the particular country,  but government  can  mand) and technicdl efficiency  (excessively  high unit
do much to reduce the magnitude of the problems  costs and lack of innovation  or technological  change).
resulting from decentralization without at  the same  The central government  cau correct the problems
time eliminating its positive features.  In particular,  of decentralized  education without  incurring the costs
government can respond to the problems of decen-  of social and  technical inefficiency  associated with
tralization  by  (i)  nationalizing  and  centralizing  centralized finance and pro"ision of all educational
elementary-secondary  education,  (ii) regulating  decen-  functions. To do so requires a combination  of regula-
tralized education, or (iii) establishing  incentives  for  tory and incentive measures.  The policy tools avail-
local (or regional)  governments  to act consistent  with  able to  government and  their application to  these
central government  objectives  and social welfare. In  problems  are summarized  in Table 4.
aUl  cases, the  ultimate decisionmaker is the central
government, yet there are significant  differences be-  Regulations  and Incentives
tween these three options in terms of the amount of
decisionmaking  authority given to  regional or local  The central government can improve information
authorities.  available  to local decisionmakers,  some of whom may
be novices  in education, by defining minimum stan-
Problems of Decentraized  dards  of  school organization, curriculum, teacher
Educational Systems  qualifications,  and achievement  levels.  For the pur-
poses of informed decisionmaking,  these standards
There are several reasons to argue for a strong  cen-  need only be defined, not regulated and enforced.
tral government role in elementary-secondary  educa-  The standards  should  be realistic,  minimum  standards,
tion.  First, education  yields social  benefits,  which  will  not ideal standards; the latter, if unattainable, may
be underproduced in a completely  decentralized  sys-  provide littie useful guidance in decisionmaking. In
tem. Second,  communities  and their leaders may lack  addition, since parents selecting private schools face
the information  to select competent teachers and de-  the same informational problem as community deci-
sign curiculum and organize schooling;  a completely  sionmakers,  these  same  informational  standards
decentralized  system  may  result in inefficient  resource  should also apply to private schools.
allocation.  Third, employers and  advanced educa-  The central government can also help inform the
tional institutions  may lack the information  to evaluate  employers  of educated youngsters  and advanced  insti-
the educational attainment of elementary-secondary  tutions of learning regarding the level and extent of
school graduates; a  completely  decentralized system  knowledge. This  information  is most directly  provided
may result in uncertainty  regarding the level and type  through a national or regional system  of standardized
of knowledge acquired by students and may impose  examinations  or uniform criteria for grade promotion
additional screening costs  on  employers.  Fourth,  or school graduation. Failing the adoption of an ex-
there may be horizontal  and vertical  inequity  in educa-  ammation  system  or uniform promotion  criteria, there
tional fiaance and expenditure;  in a decentralized  sys-  is an economic  argument  for central government  regu-
tem horizontal inequity may result in an inefficient  lation and  enforcement of  minimum standards of
distribution of specialzed skills,  and vertical inequity  school organization  and curiculum, in private as well
may conflict  with societal norms of economic  justice.  as public schools.
The question is not whether the central government  The problem of interjuisdictional spillovers  results
(or in some cases the regional government) should  in local governments,  in aggregate, spending inade-
exercise  a strong role in elementary-secondary  educa-  quate amounts on  elementary-secondary  education.
tion but, rather, what should be  the nature of that  The central government  can respond to this problem
role.  Centralized  control and provision  of all educa-  through either regulation or the establishment  of in-22
Table 4
Central Government  Policies  in a Decentralized  System
Poliy  Tool  Pol  Goak  Rwnpk
Information  and  Improve local administra-  Define minimum  expected standards of school
Training  live capacity  and tech.  organization,  curriculum,  teacher qualirications,
nical expertise.  and knowledge  required for promotion.  Train local
administrators in personnel and fiscal adminis-
tration.
Financial  Incse  educational  Provide a centrai government matching  grant for
Inenatives  spending to compensate  local educational spending up to some desired
for benefit spilloves.  leve, beyond which marginal  social benefits are
presumed to fall rapidly.
Redistribution  Reduce horizontal and  ProAde central government  per student grants to
vertical inequities.  local schools,  the value of which  varies inversely
with the local tax base per pupil (horizontal
equity) or inversely  with the level of local educa-
tional expenditures  per pupil (vertical  equity).
Regulations  and  Realize positive  external  Establish a regional or national system  of stand-
Mandates  benefits from definition  ardized examinations  for grade promotion or school
of educational staudards.  graduation.
Nationalization  Realize economies  of scale  The central government  assumes responsibiity for
through centralization  of  developing  the curriculum,  teaching mateials, and
some educational functions.  textbooks in some subjects; it might also develop a
rational system of standardized examinations.
centives  to spend more. Regulation  typicaly takes the  stration and compliance,  matching  grants for revenues
form of specifying  and enforcing  a minimum  expendi-  collected  through user fees, or other forms of match-
ture per pupil or specifying  (as in Brazil) that local  ing grants. (An example  of a disincentive  to user fees
governments  spend a given percentage of total reve-  is found in Indonesia  where all the revenue from sec-
nues on education. Matching  grants from the central  ondary education user fees is transferred to the cen-
government  can be used to provide  an incentive  to the  tral government; parents thus have no  incentive to
local government  to increase spending,  at least up to  raise user fees in order to improve  local education).
some minimum level of spending which assures the  Solving  the problem of horizontal inequity  requires
provision  of basic educational services. Both regula-  reducing  or eliminating  the advantage  associated  with
tion and incentive  grants require local governments  to  a higher per pupil tax base.  This can only be done by
employ  a standardized accounting  system  and require  the  central government in  effect redistributing tax
the central government  to undertake periodic audits  revenues  from high to low  tax base jurisdictions. This
of the use of funds.  redistribution can take several forms.  The central
Aside from the problem of underspending  due to  government  can use its general tax revenues to fund
spiliovers  of educational  benefits,  there may  be a gen-  capitation  grants for education,  the amount of which  is
eral problem of underinvestment  by a society in its  inversely related to the per pupil tax base.  Or, the
human capital.  If this is perceived to be the case by  government  can include per pupil tax base as a vari-
the central government,  it may introduce  either regu-  able determining  the magnitude  of other kinds of cash
lations or incentives  to local governments  to increase  transfers, including  project and matching grants.
spending. Regulations  may include those mentioned  Alternatively,  if local education tax revenues are
above,  such as specifying  minimum  expenditure  levels,  primarily  derived from a single tax source, the central
minimum tax rates, or minimum  user fee levels. In-  government could establish a single schedule of tax
cenies  may include rewards for better  tax admini-  rates and revenue per  pupil, administer that tax and23
collect revenues. Of course,  given the single  schedule,  tary-secondary  education. The first is the appropriate
jurisdictions with a high tax base would  in effect pay  tradeoff  between  efficiency  and eqt ity. The second  is
more in taxes than they would receive in revenues,  what measures to use to attain the desired balance.
while the opposite would  be true for jurisdictions  with  Sorial and technical  efficiency  require some degree
a low tax base.  This solution  would effectively  elimi-  of public choice regarding spending, taxing and  re-
nate horizontal  inequity  while preserving  the ability  of  source allocation; stimulation of competition and in-
local governments  to decide  which  tax rate and corre-  novation;  and  possibly  incentives to increase educa-
sponding educational  expenditure  level they prefer.  tional taxes, user fees, and spending. Horizontal and
Reducing horizontal inequity also helps solve the  vertical equity require limiting the degree of public
problem of vertical inequity,  but there can simultane-  choice  and possibly  limiting educational  revenues and
ously  be  horizontal equity  and  large  educational  expenditures.
spending  differences. Hence, the central government  All countries use some combination of centralized
may wish to directly  reduce vertical  inequity. Possible  control,  including  direct finance and provision,  regula-
solutions are to impose direct limits on expenditures  tions, grants and other incentives  to attain some de-
per pupil (this is done, for example,  in California),  to  sired combination  of efficiency  and equity. That de-
limit tax rates for high tax base jurisdictions,  to regu-  sired combination is a social and political decision.
late and limit user fees (possibly including  limits on  The important question is not so much the selected
fees and, thus, expenditures  in private  education),  and  combination  but whether or not a country could not
to provide  cash transfers to assure that all jurisdictions  atain more of one without suffering  less of the other.
attain some minimum level of spending.  In  many countries large  inequities in  educational
spending  exist in spite of a highly centralized educa-
Efflciency  venus Equity  tional system  adopted in the name of equity. In some
cases it may be possible to decentralize some educa-
Two basic problems confront central governments  tional functions, improve efficiency,  and not worsen
with respect to the finance and provision  of elemen-  spending  inequities.24
V.  The Consequences of Decentralization
Controlling  for other factors,  a policy  of educational  teriine success  in implementing  decentralization  poli-
d-c.piaalization  is expected  to result  in improved  edu-  cies. These  studies  do not, in general,  consider  the
c.,tional  efficiency  and worsened  equity.  Unfortu-  educational  (cluding  efficiency  and equity)  impacts
nately,  the experience  of countries  to date provides  of decentralization.  Rather, they  consider  which  fac-
very  little  empirical  evidence  on the economic  conse-  tors appear to determine  success  in changing  the
quences  of decentralization.  And there is no predic-  organization  and distribution  of decisionmaking  power
tive  theory  or model  that enables  us to make  confident  in education.  These  factors  are summarized  here. In
conclusions about  the  independent effects  of  addition,  the question  of implementation  strategies  is
decentralization.  briefly  discussed.
One problem  in assessing  the effects  of decentrali-
zation  is defining  what  constitutes  a policy.  At one ex-  Factors Influencing  Implementatlon
treme,  significant  educational  reform  can  take  place  in
the absence  of formally  stated  policies  or comprehen-  A  variety  of factors  affect  public  policy  implementa-
sive  plans (see the McGinn,  Schiefelbein,  and War-  tion  in developing  countries,  a number  of which  were
wick  analysis  of major educational  policy  changes  in  discussed  earlier  as possible  constraints  to the optimal
the absence  of plans  in Chile  and El Salvador).  At the  centralization  or decentralization  of education.  These
other extreme,  grandiose  policies  are sometimes  sud-  factors  include  the system  of public  finance,  the  politi-
denly  announced  and just as quickly  dropped. And  cal  context,  government  and administrative  structures,
between  these extremes  are the policies  which are  and the historical  and cultural  context. (see Cheema
carefully  formulated  but only half-heartedly  imple-  and Rondineli,  1983,  for an up-to-date  survey  of  stud-
mented.  Simply  the difficulty  in defining  decentraiza-  ies  on the implementation  of decentralization  in devel-
tion policy  presents  an important  caveat  to drawing  oping  nations).
firm  conclusions  from actual  country  experience.
Aside  from the question  of what constitutes  policy  Publk Finance
is the matter  of the criteria  to use to evaluate  policy
success.  Policies  can be evaluated  in terms  of stated  A minimum  requirement  for deconcentration  in
government  objectives,  underlying  political  goals, or  education  is the transfer  of resources  and resource  al-
more  objective  educational  and economic  criteria.  Of  location  authority  from the central  ministry  to its re-
these  three,  stated  government  objectives  are the  least  gional  or local directorates. For devolution  and the
useful  for evaluation  purposes. Stated  objectives  are  effective transfer of  independent decisionmaking
often vague and generaL For example,  the stated  power  local or regional  authorities  must have their
objectives  for decentralization  in Mexico  are (accord-  own  source  of revenues.  That source  of revenues  may
ing to Prawda):  be earmarked  central  government  tax  revenues  (as in
Brazil),  user  fees or involuntary  contributions  or own-
* improve  educational  development  in the  source  tax  revenues.  The  regional  education  director-
states;  ates in  the unsuccessful  Perumian  decentralization
effort  had no source of local revenues,  nor did they
* make  plans  and solve  problems  where  they  have  their  own  budgets. On  the other  hand,  successfu
occur;  attempts  at promoting  local  education  in Africa  have
typically  entailed  communities  making  liberal  use of
* improve  the efficient  and effective  use of  user fees and involuntary  association  cash and non-
resources;  and  cash  contributions.
* increase  the participation  and responsibil-  Potical Conte$
ity  of the community  in education.
Political  and organizational  support  are critical  deter-
Notwithstanding  the difficulties  in defining  policies  minants  of policy  implementation.  Decentralizaton
and statng precise  educational  objectives,  there is a  alters  the distribution  of power and leads  to natural
large  literature  analyzing  which  factors  appear  to de-  conflicts  between  educators  and parents  and between25
ministry  and local officials. Three interest groups are  tion between the center and the decentralized  units,
especially  important:  teachers, ministry  officials,  and  and incentives  for  administrators to  implement the
local officials.  new policies.
Teachers play a  critical role in implementing  any  Specificity  of laws and regulations are important. If
decentralization  plan, and a failure to include them in  the descriptions  of new roles, activities  and coordinat-
policy  formulation can doom efforts at decentraliza-  ing activities  under decentralization  are unclear, there
tion. They were ignored in the Peruvian  decentraliza-  may  be little effort to alter actions. Vagueness  in im-
tion effort and subsequently used the newly created  plementation  plans and directives  permit an organiza-
community  organizations to oppose the government  tion to claim existing  activitica  meet those directives
(McGinn and Street, 1986). Ministry  officials  have  the  (Montjoy  and O'Toole, 1979). In the case of Peru, the
most to lose in decentralization,  and active resistance  regional and local directorates created by the decen-
by  factions within the  ministry represent a  major  t alization plan suffered from ambiguity as to their
threat to implementing  decentralization. In construct-  role.  The ministry of education used dhem as its
ing an implementation strategy, it is important that  administratve arms.  They were never given the op-
key ministry  officials  have an incentive  to see the pro-  portunity to fulfill  decentralization  objectives  because
gram succeed.  they were always  responding to ministry requests for
In addition,  to political  support by important inter-  more plans and data.  Drawing  from the experiences
est groups, political continuity  at the national level is  of successful  countries, Bray (1985) specifies  the kinds
required.  Venezuela, for example, experienced sev-  of details required for successful  introduction  of com-
eral changes in political administration in the 1970s,  munity  schools.
although there was consistent support for a policy  of
deconcentration to  regional and  local directorates.  Histoncal  and Cultural  Context
Decentralization plans were  announced with every
change in  administration in  1969, 1974, 1977, and  Culture refers to the traditional role of communi-
1979. Support for decentralization  was consistent  and  ties and citizens'  attitudes towards authority. Accord-
financial resources were  abundant, but  every new  ing to observers, decentralization was relatively  suc-
minister of education announced a  revision of the  cessful  in Eastern Nigeria,  in part due to a tradition of
previous  decentralization  plan. As a result, decentrali-  community  competition (Okove, 1986).  This native
zation was never implemented (Hansen).  tradition was further fostered by the colonial practice
Political  instability in Venezuela took the form of  of communities  constructing  and paying  the recurrent
frequent changes in ministers within a democratically  costs of mission schools. Another positive  feature is
elected  government. In other cour.  ies  political  insta-  that communities  are small and blood-related,  making
bility  takes  the form of frequent  changes  from authori-  it easier to control the free-rider problem common  to
tarian military regimes with a  need for centralized  the provision  of collective  goods (lgwe).  Success  in
control to popular democracy  and the mandate to re-  Eastern Nigeria can be contrasted to the failure of
turn power to the people.  Peruvian  education decentralization. One of the fac-
Frequent political  and policy  changes  often destroy  tors contributing  to lack of success  in Peru was a po-
fragile local governmont and  community organiza-  litical culture  highly deferential  to  authority and
tons; it is in general far easier to centralize than to  center-based  decisions  (Stromquist,  1986).
decentralize. An example of how policies change is  Culture also has much to do with  the origins  of de-
Pakistan,  which  gained independence  in 1947  with  ele-  centralization  policies  in the first place. In Kenya,  for
mentary education provided by private schools and  example,  the pressure for decentralization  originated
local schools run by district councils and municipal  with the  community, not  the  central  government.
governments. Education was centralized to the pro-  When decentralization policies come from the bot-
vincial  level in 1962,  and in 1972 all private schools  tom-up rather  than  the top-down there  are higher
were nationalized.  In  1979, the government again  expectations  for participation and stronger pressures
legalized  private schools.  for implementation  (Conyers,  1983).
Govemrnment  and Adminlstrative  Structures  Implementation  Strategies
Successful implementation of decentralization re-  Implementation of  decentralization policies re-
quires precise and concise laws and regulations  gov-  quires a plan of action.  Rondinelli (1986) notes at
erning the effort, effective  and frequent communica-  least four important elements to a successful  strategy.26
(i) concentrate initial efforts on smaU  scale activities  sure, an attempt was made in several cities in the late
for which there  is popular support and  recognized  1960s  and early 1970s  to decentralize and give com-
need; (ii) gradually  expand the scope of decentralized  munity  groups  more say in operation of neighborhood
activities as local managerial and financial capacity  schools.  One city -- New York -- even permitted
increase; (iii) alter the mission of the central govern-  neighborhoods  to elect local school  boards to formal-
ment ministry to support and facilitate  the decentral-  ize community  participation.
ized units, as opposed to direct provision  and control;  The  dynamics of  decentralization efforts  in  the
and (iv) train both local and central government ad-  United States were not  unlike those in developing
ministrators  and officials  to change  attitudes as weU  as  nations today. Most announced  efforts at decentrali-
improve  the skills  required in a decentralized  environ-  zation were attempts at administrative decentraliza-
ment.  tion with no provision  for parental participation  (see
Fantini and Gitell, 1973). Major opposition  to decen-
Tle  United States' Experience  tralization came from those groups most at  risk in
losing  power -- school  teachers and administrators. In
Elementary and secondary  education in the United  other  words, much like decentralization efforts in
States are usually viewed as being highly decentral-  other countries, the United States experience relied
ized,  with local government,  usually  special  school  dis-  upon the opponents of decentralization  to implement
tricts, raising revenues and providing  education. The  it.
federal government plays only a very minor role in  The effects of decentralization  efforts in the United
elementary-secondary  education, although state gov-  States were neither large nor permanent, in part a
ernments have assumed an increasingly  active role in  result of insufficient  funding. Creation of smaller de-
regulating and  financing education provided at  the  cisionmaking  units did not necessarily  increase citizen
local level.  involvement  in education, although different citizens
Some  urban school  districts,  however,  are very  large  (community  activists)  did become involved  (La Noue
with enrollments as large as some countries and en-  and Smith, 173).  The reforms appeared to bring
compassing a  large  number of ethnic and  income  about some minor curriculum  changes,  but no empiri-
groups.  These large districts are effectively  run by  cal evidence exists  on the impact on student achieve-
professional staff and the teachers' union with little  ment.
opportunity for parental participation.  (See Clark's  In short, decentralization  in United States cities  ex-
description  of this situation.) Frustration was so high  perienced  many of the same implementation  problems
that a movement  arose to create independent  commu-  as  decentralization efforts in  developing countries.
nity schools, not unlike the "harambee" schools of  And the evidence  as to the empirical  effects  of decen-
Kenya. Largely in response to minority group pres-  tralization efforts is no better for the U.S. than the
developing  countries.27
VI.  Research Agenda
In  theory, decentralization has  the  potential to
improve both  the  finance and  efficiency of public  2. How does decentralization  affect technical
education, as well as the potential to worsen equity.  efficiency  and costs?
In reality, we know very little about the effects of de-
centralization  on efficiency  and equity. A number of  Decentralzation should, in theory, also result in
case  studies  exist  descnbing why decentralzation  improved technical  efficiency  and lower unit costs for
policies were  formulated,  how  they  were  imple-  a given  quality  of education. But under which  types of
mented, why implementation was successful or not,  decentralization and which types of institutional ar-
and which  interest groups appeared  to win  or lose as a  rangements  does this in fact occur?  Are total admin-
result.  These studies permit some generalizations  istrative  costs  higher  or  lower  in  decentralized
about the politics of decentralization  but permit al-  systems? Are community  resources more or less ef-
most none about the educational  or economic  conse-  fectively  used in decentralized  systems?
quences. Given the lack of generalizable  results and
the lack of a predictive  model of the effects of decen-  3. What is the relationship  between decentrali-
tralization,  advocacy  or opposition  to decentralizaton  zation, competition between communities,
must  be  based  on  either  theoretical or  political  and innovation?
grounds.
As a policy,  decentralization  is faddish. It was ini-  Decentralization  should, also, lead to greater com-
tially  advocated  in developing  countries in the 1950s  as  petition between communities  and greater innovation
a means of establishing  and reforming local govern-  in the delivery  of educational  services. To what extent
ment.  With the sudden popularity of national plan-  does this occur? How can competition  and innovation
ning in the 1960s,  attention became focused on im-  be fostered in a decentralized  system?  What is the
proving plnning  and  administraton at  the  center.  evidence  from the decentralized  systems  that currently
When it was discovered  that national planning  could  exist?
not in and of itself solve persistent educational  prob-
lems, attention in the 1980s once again became fo-  4. Under which  conditions  does decentraliza-
cused on decentralization.  tion lead to increased community finance
and increased  per pupil educational  spend-
What We Need to Know  ing?
Before decentralzation can be endorsed (or  op-  From the perspective  of governments  faced  with ex-
posed) as good public  policy,  there is much that needs  penditures growing  more rapidly than revenues, the
to be learned from existing  decentralized  systems  and  prospect of shifting  finance of education  to local com-
past attempts at decentralization. In addition, it may  munities is attractive indeed.  Which conditions are
be necessary  to undertake small scale experiments  in  required for communities  to take the initiative  in rais-
decentralization  in order to answer some of the more  img  educational  revenues?  How can the central gov-
important questions regarding effects. The most im-  ermnent facilitate  such action by communities? Does
portant questions to which answers are needed are  the shiftig  of financing  responsibility  from central to
given below.  regional  or local governments  lead to higher or lower
spending per  pupil?  None of these questions have
1. What is the impact of decentralization  on  been answered,  although  careful  study  of decentraliza-
social efficiency?  tion experiments  might yield  some tentative  answers.
In theory, decentralization should lead to  an im-  5. To  what  extent  are  intergovernmental
proved match between consumer-citizen  preferences  transfers consistent  with decentralized  de-
and the quality and quantity of educational services  cisionmaking?
provided. But the magnitude of this improvement  is
unknown,  as is how the magnitude may vary  with the  Most  countries decentralize educational finance
qpe of decentralization  undertaken.  through the use of intergovernmental  grants to re-28
gional and/or  local governments.  Most commonly,  educational functions  should be ceontraized  or decen-
these grants are conditional on required actions or  tralized in order to yield gains in efficiency  and man-
performance by the recipient of the grant, but this  agement?
conditionality  itself limits decisionmaking  independ-
ence.  How can grants be organized to transfer re-  Researeh Design
sources while maintaining decisionmaking  independ-
ence by the grantee?  Under what conditions  would  At least four basic research designs could be de-
such unconditional  grants be politicaLly  acceptable?  vised to answer the above questions.  The first is to
simply  monitor and evaluate ongoing or past decen-
6. How does decentralization  affect horizon-  tralization efforts, focusing on  the above questions.
tal and vertical equity?  Existing studies of decentralization cases have not
focused  on these questions  and rarely provide  empiri-
Decentralization  is predicted to increase horizontal  cal conclusions. The second is to undertake a system-
and vertical inequity. To what extent has this proven  atic comparative study of centralized and decentral-
true in  decentralization programs?  Are  inequities  ized educational  systems,  again with an emph-sis on
larger  in  decentralized or  federalized developing  the collection of data aimed at answering the above
countries than in centralized  or unitary governme s?  questions. The third is to monitor (and possibly  fund
What has been  the impact of redistributive  central  small scale) new decentralization  efforts. Fmally,  the
government grants on  spending inequities between  centralization  or decentralization  of particular educa-
regions or communities?  tional functions could be studied.  For example, a
study to examine  the determinants  of local community
7. Can the virtues of decentrazation  be at-  financial support of education might be undertaken
tained in a centralized system?  either across communities  within a particular country
or across countries demonstrating  large variance in
Decentralization  in the form of devolution is pre-  financial  support.
dicted to have a number of positive  effects on educa-  Specific  research designs could be developed  to at-
tional efficiency,  finance, and management. To what  tempt to answer each of the questions posed above.
extent can these advantages  be attained in a central-  Clearly,  the appropriate design would depend on the
ized system? In other words,  to what extent does de-  country or countries being studied, their institutions,
centralization  of decisionmaking  have to occur in or-  and the type of decentralization  undertaken.
der to  realize significant efficiency  gains?  Which29
References
Ayot, H.0.,  and K  Lillis, "Community  Flnancing of  don  and Development,  Vol. 3, 1983,  pp. 97-109.
Schools: Issues from Kenya," paper prepared for the
workshop on  Community  Financing  of Schools, Ga-  Conyers,  D., "Decentralization  and Development: A
borone-,  Botswana,  June 1985.  Review  of the Literature," Public  Adminisaion  and
Development,  4, 1984,  pp. 187-197.
Baht Roy, Jerry  Miner, and Larry Schroeder,  "Mobiliz-
ing Local  Resources in Developing  Countries,"  Public  Fantini, Mario and Marilyn Gittel,  Decentralization.
Admhinbtraton  and Development, VoL 4, 1984, pp.  Achieving Reform.  New York:  Praeger Publishers,
215-230.  1973.
Bahl, Roy, and S. Nath, "Public Expenditure Decen-  Gomez-Buendia,  Hernando and Rodrigo Losada-Lora,
tralization  in Developing  Countries,"  Environment  and  Organizacion  y  Conflicto: La  Educacion Prnimana
Planning Govemnment  and Policy, VoL 4, 1986,  pp.  Oficial  en Colombia. Bogota: Centro Internacional  de
405418.  Investigaciones  para el Desarrollo, 1984.
Bray, Mark, Educational  Planning  in a Decentralised  Guthrie, James, School  Finance  Policies  and Practces.
System.  7he Papua  New Guinean  Eperdence. Sydney  Cambridge: Ballinger  Publishing,  1980.
Sydney  University  Press, 1984.
Hansen,  E. Mark,  "Administrative  Reform  in the Vene-
Bray,  Mark,  "A Resource  Book on Community  Fmanc-  zuelan Ministry  of Education: A Case Analysis  of the
ing for Govermnents  and Voluntary  Agencies." Paper  1970s,"  International  Review  of Education, m  (1984),
delivered at the Botswana conference on Community  pp. 119-140.
Financing  of Schools, June 1985.
Hanson, Mark, "Organizational  Bureaucracy  in Latin
Breton, Albert, "A Theory of Govermment  Grants,"  America and  the  Legacy of Spanish Colonialism,"
Canadian  Joumal of Economics  and Political  Science,  Joumal of Interamerican  Sudwes and World Affairs,
May 1965,  pp. 175-187.  VoL 16, No. 2 (May 1974),  pp. 199-219.
Buchanan,  James M., "Federalism and Fiscal Equity,"  Hinchliffei,  Keith, "Federal Fmance,  Fiscal Imbalance,
Amedcan Economic Review,  September 1950.  and Educational  Inequality,"  The World Bank, Educa-
tion & Training Series Discussion  Paper No. EDT 72,
Beyna, Larry, et. aL, Managing  Decentralization.  An  1987.
Annotated Bibliography. Syracuse: Maxwell  School
Syracuse  University,  1977.  Hurst, Paul "Decentralization: Panacea or Red Her-
ring?" in Lauglo,  Jon, et. aL, 7he Control  of Education,
Carron, Gabriel, and Ta Ngoc  Chau,  Regional  Dpari-  pp. 79-85.
ties in Educational  Development A  Controversial  Is-
sue.  Paris: uNEso/International Institute for Educa-  Igwe, S. 0.,  "Community Fiancing  of Schools in
ticnal Planning, 1980.  Eastern Nigeria,"  paper prepared for the workshop  on
Community  Financing  of  Schools,  Gaborone,
Cheema, G. Shabbir and Dennis A. Rondinelli  (eds.),  Botswana,  June 1985.
Decentratization  and Development. Policy Implemen-
tation in Developing  Countzies. Beverly  Hills:  Sage,  Jimenez, Emmanuel and Jee-Peng Tan, "Educational
1983.  Development  in Pakdstan:  The Role of User Charges
and Private Education," The World Bank, Education
Clark, Kenneth, Powerlessness  in  the Ghetto. New  and Training Series Discussion Paper No. EDT 16,
York: Prager, 1978.  1985.
Conyers, D., "Decentralization: The Latest Fashion  rmenez, Emmanuel  and Jee-Peng  Tan, "Decentralized
in Development  Administration?" Public  Adninistra-  and Private Education.  The Case of Pakistan," The30
World Bank, Education & Traning  Series Discussion  Fmance in Tunisia," Public  Administration  and Devel-
Paper No. EDT 67, 1987.  opment, VoL 5, No. 3 (1985), pp. 187-204.
Knight, JB.,  and R.H. Sabot, "Overview  of Educa-  Noah, Harold J.  and Joel D. Sherman, Educational
tional Expansion, Productivity, and  Inequality.  A  Financing and  Policy Goals for  Piimay  Schools.
Comparative Analysis of the  East  African Natural  Paris:  Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Experiment,"  The World Bank, Education & Training  Development,  1979.
Series Discussion Paper No. EDT 48, 1986.
Oates, Wallace. Fscal Federalism New  York  Har-
Lankford,  R. Hamilton, "Preferences of Citizens for  court Brace, 1972.
Public Expenditures on  Elementary and Secondary
Education,"  Joumal of Econometrics,  27, 1985,  pp. 1-  Okoye,  Mary,  "Community  Secondary  Schools:  A Case
20.  Study  of a Nigerian  Innovation  in Self-Help,"  Interna-
donal  Joumal of Educatonal Development,  VoL  6, No.
La Noue, George R. and Bruce L  R. Smith, 7he Poli-  4 (1986).
tics of School  Decentralization.  Lexington: Leinigton
Books, 1973.  Paul, Una M., et.al., 'Participation of Local Communi-
ties in the Fmancing  of Education in Guyana," Pros-
Lauglo,  Jon, Martin McLean and Mark Bray (eds.),  pects, VoL  XVI, No. 3 (1986),  pp. 377-387.
The Control of Education.  Intematonal Perspectives
on  the Centralization-Decentralization  Debate.  Lon-  Peacock, A. and J. Wiseman, The Growh of Public
don.  Heinemann, 1985.  Expendiaw in the UK  Princeton,  Ni:  Princeton Uni-
versity  Press, 1961.
Magendzo,  A. and L. Egana, "Subyacentes  Teorico-
Politicos  del Proceso  de Descentralizacion  Educacional  Ponmerehne, W., "Quantitative  Aspects  of Federalism:
en Chile:  1973-1983,"  Revista Ladnoamericana  de  A Study  of Six Countries" in W. E. Oates (ed.), The
Estudios  Educativos,  Vol. XV, No. 1 (1985),  pp. 69-81.  Political Economy of Fiscal Federalism. Lexington,
Lexington  Books, 1977,  pp. 275-305.
McGinn,  Noel and Susan  Street, "The Political  Ration-
ality  of Resource  Allocation in Mexican  Public  Educa-  Prawda, Juan,  Teona  y Prwis de la Planeacion  Edu-
tion," Comparative  Education Review, 26, 1982, pp.  cativa  en Mexico. Mexico: Editorial Grijalbo, 1984.
178-198.
Psacharopoulas, George,  and  Maureen  Woodhall,
McGinn, Noel and Susan Street, "Educational  Decen-  Education  for Development. New  York:  Oxford  Uni-
tralization Weak  State or Strong  State?" Comparudve  versity  Press, 1985.
Education Review,  VoL 30, No. 4, 1986,  pp. 471-490.
Robinson, Jean  C., 'Decentralization, Money, and
McGinn,  Noel and Susan  Street, "La Descentralizacion  Power.  The Case of People-Run Schools in China,"
Educacional en America Latina.  Politica Nacional  o  Comparatve  Education Review, VoL 30, No. 1, 1986,
Lucha de Facciones?" La Educacion. Revista Inter-  pp. 73-88.
ameikano de Desarrollo  Educativo. 30 (99) 1986,  pp.
20-65.  Rondinelli,  Dennis A., "Government  Decentralization
in Comparative  Perspective: Theory and Practice in
Meesook, Oey Astra, "Fmancing and Equity in the  Developing  Countries,"  Intemational  Review  ofAdmin-
Social  Sectors  in Indonesia,"  The World Bank, mimeo,  iktative Science, VoL 47, No. 2, 1981.
no date.
Rondinelli,  Dennis A., John R. Nellis, and G. Shabbir
Montjoy, R. and  L. O'Toole, "Toward a Theory of  Cheema, Decentraliztion in Developing  Countries:  A
Policy Implementation:  An Organizational Perspec-  Review  of Recent  Epetience.  World Bank Staff Work-
tive,"  Public  Administration  Review, 1979,  pp. 465-476.  ing Paper No. 581. Washington,  D.C..: World Bank,
Nellis, John R., "Decentralization and Local Public  1984.31
Saqeb, G.N., "The Effects of Tensions Between Na-  United  Nations, Decertralzotion for  National and
tionalism and Provincialism  on Educational Admini-  Local Development. New York:  United Nations De-
stration in Pakistan" in J. Lauglo, et.aL, The Control  partment of Economic  andSocial  Affairs, Division  for
of Education, pp. 33-44.  Public  Administration,  Technical  Assistance  Program,
1982.
Schoefthaler,  Traugott, "Propositions  for Revitalizing
Research  on Educational  Decentralization,"  paper pre-  Veeraraghavan,  J., "India: Mechanism  for the Alloca-
sented at International Institute for Educational  Plan-  tion of Resources to Education from the Federation
ning, Paris,  December 1985.  to the States."  Paris:  IIEP, UNESCC  1982.
Smith, B., "The Measurement of Decentralization,"  Vieira, P., Toward a  7heory of Decentralization:  A
Intemadional  Review of Administrative  Sciences,"  Vol.  Comparative  View  of Fony-Five  Countries. Ph.D. dis-
15, 1979,  pp. 213-222.  sertation. School  of Public  Administration,  University
of Southern California,  1967.
Stephens, David, "Decentralization of Education in
Northern Nigeria" in Lauglo, et.al., The Control of  Winkler,  Donald R., "The Distribution of Educational
Education, pp. 159-168.  Resources in Paraguay," Comparative  Education Re-
view, Vol. 24, No. 1 (February 1980),  pp. 73-86.
Stromquist,  Nelly  P.,  "Decentrafizing  Educational  Deci-
sion-Making  in Peru: Intentions and Realities,"  Inter-  Wiker,  Donald R., "Fisc  Federalism and Primary
national  Joumal of Educational  Development,  VoL 6,  Education Finance:  Brazil and the United States,"
No. 1, 1986,  pp. 47-60.  paper presented at the Universite  de Dijon,  June 1986.
Tilak, Jandhyala B.G., "Centre-State Relations in Fl-  World Bank,  World  Bank Development  Report 1983.
nancing Education in India."  New Delhi: National  Washington,  D.C.:  1983.
Institute of Educational  Planning and Administration,
1984.  World Bank, BraziL  Finance of Pmaiy  Education.
Washington,  D.C..:  The World Bank, 1986.
Tilak,  Jandhyala B.G.,  "Public  Financing  of Education
in a Federal State: The Case of India."  New Delhi:  Zagefkca  Yannakopulos,  Polymnia,  "Eleven  Experiences
National Institute of Educational Planning and Ad-  in Innovations  in Decentralization  of Educational  Ad-
ministration,  1986.  ministration and Management of Local Resources,"
mimeo.  Paris:  UNESCO, August 1980.PPR  Working  Paper  Series
Title  Author  Date  Contact
WPS122 Import  Demand  In  Developing
Countries  Riccardo  Faini  November  1988  K.  Cabana
Lant  Pritchett  61539
Fernando  Clavijo
WPS123 Export  Supply,  Capacity  and  Relative
Prices  Riccardo  Faini  November  1988  K.  Cabana
61539
WPS124 International  Macroeconomic
Adjustment,  1987-1992:  A  World
Model  Approach  Robert  E.  King  November  1988  K.  Adams
Helena  Tang  33738
WPS125 The  Effects  of Financial  Liberaliza-
tion  on  Thailand,  Indonesia  and
the  Philippines  Christophe  Chamley  October  1988  A.  Bhalla
Qaizar  Hussain  60359
WPS126 Educating  Managers  for  Business  and
Goverment:  A Review  of International
Experience  Samuel  Paul  November  1988  E.  Madrona
John  C. Ickis  61711
Jacob  Levitsky
WPS127 Linking  Development,  Trade,  and
Debt  Strategies  In  Highly  Indebted
Countries  Ishac  Diwan  November  1988  1.  Diwan
33910
WPS128 Public  Finances  in  Adjustment  Programs  Ajay  Chhibber  December  1988  A.  Bhalla
J.  Khalilzadeh-Shirazi  60359
WPS129 Women  In  Development:  Defining  the
Issues  Paul  Collier  December  1988  J.  Klous
33745
WPS130 Maternal  Education  and  the  Vicious
Circle  of High  Fertility  and  Mal-
nutrition:  An  Analytic  Survey  Matthew  Lockwood  December  1988  J.  Klous
Paul  Collier  33745
WPS131 Implementing  Direct  Consumption
Taxes  in  Developing  Countries  George  R.  Zodrow  December  1988  A.  BhalIa
Charles  E.  McLure,  Jr.  60359
WPS132 Is  the  Discount  on the  Secondary  Market
A  Case  for  LDC  Debt  Relief?  Daniel  Cohen  November  1988  M. Luna
33729PPR  Working  Paper  Series
Title  Author  Date  Contact
WPS133 Lewis  Through  a Looking  Glass:  Public
Sector  Employment,  Rent-Seeking  and
Economic  Growth  Alan  Geib  November  1988  A.  Hodges
J.B.  Knight  61268
R.H.  Sabot
WPS134  International  Trade  In  Financial
Services  Siivia  B.  Sagarl  January  1989  W. Pitayatonakarn
60353
WPS135  PPR  Working  Papers  Catalog
of  Numbers  1  to 105  PPR  Dissem.  Center  November  1988  Ann  Van  Aken
31022
WPS136 Pricing  Commodity  Bonds  Using
Binomial  Option  Pricing  Raghuram  Rajan  December  1988  J.  Raulin
33715
WPS137 Trends  In  Nontariff  Barriers  of
Developed  Countries:  1966 to 1986  Sam Laird  December  1988  J.  Epps
Alexander  Yeats  33710
WPS138 Fiscal  Adjustment  and  Deficit
Financing  During  the  Debt  Crisis  William  R.  Easterly  January  1989  R.  Luz
61760
WPS139 A  Conceptual  Framework  for
Adjustment  Policies  Bela  Balassa  January  1989  N.  Campbell
33769
WPS140 Building  Educational  Evaluation
Capacity  in  Developing  Countries  John  Middleton  February  1989  C.  Cristobal
James  Terry  33640
Deborah  Bloch
WPS141 Payroll  Taxes  for  Financing  Training
in  Developing  Countries  Adrian  Ziderman  January  1989  C.  Cristobal
33640
WPS142 Vocational  Secondary  Schooling  in
Israel: A  Study  of Labor  Market
Outcomes  Adrian  Ziderman  January  1989  C.  Cristobal
33640
WPS143  Decentralization  In  Education:
An  Economnic  Perspective  Donald  R.  Winkler  March  1989  C.  Cristobal
33640